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Ability and knowledge tests are often used in academic and personnel settings to 
evaluate individuals.  For numerous reasons, providing individuals the opportunity to 
retest is recommended by scientific and professional guidelines.  Retesting consistently 
results in increased test scores.  Despite its pervasiveness, it is unclear whether this 
retesting effect reflects test-specific memory effects or functions as a learning 
intervention that increases the underlying construct.   
This dissertation’s objective was to competitively investigate whether learning or 
memory best explains the retesting effect using a 2 (same versus alternate form retest) × 
2 (corrective feedback versus no feedback) repeated measures mixed factorial 
experimental design.  Three hundred forty participants completed ability and knowledge 
retests.  Additionally, as potential explanatory variables for the retesting effect, 
participants completed measures of working memory capacity, general mental ability, 
and test attitudes. Participants also reported their retest interval behaviors.  
 The results were more in accord with a memory instead of a learning 
explanation.  Alternate retest forms attenuated the retesting effect and slowed item 
response times.  Retest increases occurred at similar magnitudes across constructs 
(knowledge and ability).  Greater working memory capacity facilitated retest increases 
only on same form retests.  Ultimately, the retesting effect does not appear to result in 
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1.  INTRODUCTION: INCREASED SCORES ON RETEST: MEMORY OR 
LEARNING EFFECTS? 
Standardized tests of cognitive ability and knowledge are commonly used in 
academic and personnel settings to evaluate test-takers, and hence, often operate as 
gatekeepers for educational and employment opportunities.  Providing individuals the 
opportunity to retest is recommended in terms of both scientific and professional 
guidelines (American Educational Research Association, American Psychological 
Association, & National Council on Measurement in Education [AERA/APA/NCME], 
2014; Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC], 1978; Society for 
Industrial and Organizational Psychology [SIOP], 2003).  Not surprisingly, many test-
takers choose to retest in order to improve their chances of attaining these educational 
and employment opportunities, especially after failing previous attempts (Brounstein & 
Holahan, 1987; Cliffordson, 2004; Lievens, Buyse, & Sackett, 2005; Tuzinski, Laczo, & 
Sackett, 2005).  A commonly observed effect of retesting is an increase in test scores.  
Despite the pervasiveness of this retesting effect, which is robust across both knowledge 
and ability construct domains, as well as academic and applied settings (Hausknecht, 
Halpert, Di Paolo, & Moriarty Gerrard, 2007; Kulik, Kulik, & Bangert, 1984), it is 
unclear whether these increases reflect test-specific memory effects or meaningful 
increases in the assessed construct domain.   
Interestingly, explanations for the retesting effect are often embedded within 
particular disciplines examining particular content domains.  Thus, cognitive psychology 
and education researchers who focus more on knowledge-based tests explain the 
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retesting effect in terms of learning.  In contrast, personnel psychologists who are 
generally focused on ability tests, explain the retesting effect in terms of memory-related 
effects; primarily as a source of error variance.  Due to this domain-specific 
embeddedness, little if any research simultaneously examines the competing learning 
and memory effect explanations for retest score increases across construct domains.   
In the context of the retesting effect, this discussion is confined to cognitive 
abilities and cognitively-loaded constructs such as knowledge.  Whereas there is a broad 
literature on retesting in noncognitive domains, such as personality, the mechanism for 
retest score increases on noncognitive constructs are quite different (i.e., self-
presentation, faking) from those within cognitively-loaded domains (i.e., memory, 
learning).  Thus, the use of the term ability will be subsequently confined to cognitive 
abilities, and the use of the term retesting effect will be confined to the explanations of 
memory or learning effects on cognitively-loaded constructs. 
Comparatively investigating the memory and learning accounts of the retesting 
effect advances the understanding of this phenomenon and presents practical 
implications and recommendations as well.  For instance, in educational contexts, 
repeated retesting has been advanced as a means of actually improving learning 
(Carpenter, 2012).  Thus, it seems plausible that testing not only assesses test-takers but 
may actually act as an intervention to increase the test-takers’ standing on the underlying 
construct (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a).  Hence, testing has been recommended as a 
proactive technique for educators to enhance learning (Dunlosky, Rawson, Marsh, 
Nathan, & Willingham, 2013; Pashler, Bain, Bottge, Graesser, Koedinger, McDaniel, & 
 3 
 
Metcalfe, 2007).  In contrast, in high-stakes testing contexts, personnel psychologists 
have argued that the retesting effect threatens the construct-related validity of tests, and 
subsequently, tests’ criterion-related validity as well (Lievens, Reeve, & Heggestad, 
2007).  Thus, depending on whether one takes the perspective that retest score gains can 
best be explained by learning or memory effects, one would draw quite different 
inferences from retest scores for both assessment and educational purposes.   
Learning occurs when the test-taker’s initial test functions as an intervention to 
further develop the underlying construct.  In contrast, memory effects occur when a test-
taker increases his/her retest score due to remembering previous responses and test-
specific information from initial testing with no concomitant development in the 
underlying construct.  Clearly, learning and memory processes (and consequently, the 
assessments related to those processes) are inextricably interconnected.  In terms of the 
present study, learning is operationally defined as retest score increases that do transfer 
across test forms; whereas memory effects are operationally defined as retest increases 
that do not transfer across test forms.  Considering the pervasiveness of the retesting 
effect across settings and constructs, as well as the differing motivations for offering 
retesting opportunities (including, fairness, adverse impact, validity, and measurement 
error), the inferences drawn from retesting scores as reflecting either learning or memory 
has profound implications for test-takers, organizations, and society.    
Furthering the understanding of the competing theoretical explanations for the 
retesting effect could potentially be a major scientific and applied contribution to the 
field.  Consequently, this dissertation comparatively investigates these two competing 
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schools of thought—specifically, whether learning or memory best explains observed 




2. THE PERVASIVENESS OF THE RETESTING EFFECT 
Score increases upon retest have been observed across numerous cognitive 
construct domains and settings, including classroom achievement tests (Friedman, 
1987), general mental ability (GMA) tests (Kaufman, 1994), college admissions exams 
(Donlon & Angoff, 1971), credentialing exams (Geving, Webb, & Davis, 2005), and 
employment tests of various types (Sackett, Burris, & Ryan, 1989; Wing, 1980).  These 
retest score increases are generally in the small to medium effect size range for both 
knowledge and ability tests (d = 0.26, Hausknecht et al., 2007; d = 0.27, Lievens et al., 
2005; d = 0. 48, Raymond, Neustel, & Anderson, 2007; d = 0.15, Schleicher, Van 
Iddekinge, Morgeson, & Campion, 2010), however, some large retesting gains have 
been observed as well (d = 0.79; Raymond et al., 2007; d = 0.93, Van Iddekinge, 
Morgeson, Schleicher, & Campion, 2011).  These gains are also robust across numerous 
underlying cognitive abilities (visual perception, mechanical comprehension, and 
selective attention [Matton, Vautier, & Raufaste, 2009]; numerical ability and abstract 
reasoning [Matton, Vautier, & Raufaste, 2011]; and short-term memory [Watson, 
Pasteur, Healy, & Hughes, 1994]).  Furthermore, final test performance exhibits score 
improvements even after multiple initial tests compared to following a single practice 
test in both knowledge (e.g., Karpicke & Roediger, 2007, 2010; Logan & Balota, 2008; 
Pavlik & Anderson, 2005) and ability content domains (Hausknecht et al., 2007), 




The frequency and incidence of retesting is not trivial.  In academic settings, as 
much as 50% of high school students retake the SAT I (Nathan & Camara, 1998), 30% 
of MCAT candidates retest (Koenig & Leger, 1997), and 40% of applicants retested for 
medical school in Belgium (Lievens et al., 2005).  In organizational settings, studies 
have reported that 11% of retail manager candidates (Tuzinski et al., 2005), 32% of 
government employees (Van Iddekinge et al., 2011), and 25% of law enforcement 
candidates (Sin, Farr, Murphy, & Hausknecht, 2004) chose to retest.  Not surprisingly, 
70% of the candidates who initially failed a promotion test chose to retest (Van 
Iddekinge et al., 2011).  Despite the extensive research investigating the retesting effect, 
organizations, educators, and policy-makers allow or forbid retesting for a variety of 




3. MOTIVATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING RETESTING 
Whereas the incentives for applicants to retest are apparent, organizations and 
policy-makers allow retesting for a variety of motivations.  Offering retesting 
opportunities within selection and promotion systems is commonplace among large 
private and public organizations (Muchinsky, 2004), and educational institutions 
(Wheeler, 2004).  Despite the prevalence of retesting, and the professional advice to 
allow it (AERA/APA/NCME, 2014; EEOC, 1978; SIOP, 2003), there is a great deal of 
variability in the specific recommendations regarding retesting policies and procedures 
(Hausknecht et al., 2007; Raymond et al., 2007).  For example, some major standardized 
test developers and publishers (e.g., SAT, GRE, LSAT, GMAT) allow retesting, albeit 
with restrictions on the minimum time intervals before retest.  Other test publishers 
recommend specific procedures for retesting (e.g., the Miller Analogies Test notes that 
“if an examinee’s second [or most recent] test score is 25 points or greater than the first 
[or most recent previous] score, the second score is invalidated”, Harcourt Assessment, 
2005).  Some strictly prohibit retesting altogether (e.g., United States Air Force’s Basic 
Attributes Test, a test battery used to select military pilots, [Carretta, Zelenski, & Ree, 
2000]).  Differences between these retesting polices reflect a lack of consensus for how 
to address the retesting effect operationally. 
Parallel to the competing learning and memory effect explanations for the 
retesting effect, retesting policy has received increased attention in recent years among 
both educators (Dunlosky et al., 2013) and personnel practitioners (e.g., Bourdeau, 2008; 
Wheeler, 2004).  In the absence of integrated research across different disciplines, 
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organizations and policy-makers that allow retesting likely do so based on four 
fundamental motivations, which are: (1) increasing perceptions of organizational 
fairness, (2) reducing adverse impact, (3) enhancing validity, and (4) reducing 
measurement error.  
3.1 Increasing Perceptions of Organizational Fairness 
Organizations seeking to attract and retain applicants prefer testing procedures 
that appear fair to applicants.  During the selection process, test-takers desire adequate 
opportunities to demonstrate their job qualifications, which may be influenced by the 
retesting policy (Schleicher, Venkataramani, Morgeson, & Campion, 2006), that in turn 
may affect test-takers’ perceptions of the organization’s procedural justice (Arvey & 
Sackett, 1993; Gilliland, 1993; Gilliland & Steiner, 2001).  Beyond the perceived 
fairness of selection procedures by test-takers, retesting policy may also affect test-
takers’ subsequent performance within an organization.  Hausknecht, Trevor, and Farr 
(2002) found that applicants who retested, compared to applicants who were hired after 
the initial test, exhibited greater organizational commitment, greater training 
performance, and reduced turnover.  Thus, organizations that wish to be perceived fairly 
and encourage committed test-takers may allow retesting for this reason alone, 
irrespective of whether retest increases reflect learning or memory effects. 
3.2 Reducing Adverse Impact 
Hausknecht et al. (2002) noted that, “systematic score changes across repeated 
administrations can result in a qualitative change in the make-up of the workforce” (p. 
244).  This statement not only reflects fluctuations in test scores within a test-taker 
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across testing administrations, but also the possibility that the retesting effect exhibits 
systematic differences between subgroups of test-takers (e.g., by race, sex, and age).  
Regardless of the literature, organizations seeking employee diversity sometimes use 
retesting in the potentially erroneous belief that retesting opportunities will reduce 
subgroup differences and in turn, reduce the risk of adverse impact in final selection 
decisions (Ployhart & Holtz, 2008).  However, in light of the numerous factors 
influencing selection at different stages of the process (e.g., differential decisions to 
retest, differential magnitude of the retesting effect, selection drop-out rates across 
subgroups), retesting appears to exacerbate subgroup differences for some groups of 
test-takers (i.e., older candidates, African-Americans), while reducing subgroup 
differences in others (i.e., females, Schleicher et al., 2010; Van Iddekinge et al., 2011). 
Previous research indicates that Whites demonstrated significantly larger score 
improvements upon retest than African-Americans and Hispanics on selection tests of 
job knowledge and verbal ability; whereas females exhibit significantly larger score 
increases upon retesting than men on performance tests, yet not ability measures 
(Schleicher et al., 2010; Van Iddekinge et al., 2011).  Additionally, test-takers under the 
age of 40 demonstrated significantly larger score gains compared with test-takers aged 
40 and older (Schleicher et al., 2010; Van Iddekinge et al., 2011).  Thus, research 
indicates that the retesting effect differentially affects subgroup differences in final test 
scores, and therefore may affect adverse impact heterogeneously across subgroups 
within organizations.  
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Opportunities to retest may also be disproportionately taken, consequently 
compounding these heterogeneous retest score increases (Schleicher et al., 2010; Van 
Iddekinge et al., 2011).  Data show differential selection drop-out rates across subgroups 
following initial testing (Schmit & Ryan, 1997) and retesting (Sin et al., 2004).  As 
Hausknecht et al. (2002) noted, (re)testing is likely to affect employment opportunities 
and therefore the diversity of entire organizations, but retesting may in fact exacerbate 
adverse impact due to the subgroup differences between retest scores and differential 
drop-out rates following (re)testing.  Accordingly, Ployhart and Holtz (2008) concluded 
that the implementation of retesting was not effective in directly reducing subgroup 
differences, and therefore unlikely to reduce the adverse impact of a test.  
3.3 Enhancing Validity 
Ability and knowledge tests are among the best predictors of job performance 
(Dye, Reck, & McDaniel, 1993; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), and are consequently, widely 
used to facilitate selection and staffing decisions.  Thus, implementing a retesting policy 
that enhances the operational validity of these measures should include distinguishing 
between retest score gains that are primarily reflecting learning versus memory effects, 
as these will result in more interpretable and therefore useful test scores. 
Some researchers have posited that retesting enhances validity through two 
possible mechanisms: test familiarity and learning.  That is, initial testing provides 
practice with the types of items encountered on the test, reducing error due to 
unfamiliarity with the test’s format, and therefore enhancing validity.  Additionally, 
testing may enhance validity by functioning as a learning intervention on the construct 
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itself (Anastasi, 1981; Anastasi & Urbina, 1997; Maurer, Salomon, & Troxtel, 1998).  
Anastasi and Urbina (1997) further distinguish between these two mechanisms as 
retesting may enhance validity through practice (raising scores and validity through 
practice on specific operationalizations by reducing error) on one hand, and teaching on 
the other (learning effects, through raising the true score across operationalizations).  
Anastasi (1981) posited that short test orientations (i.e., practice) would increase a test’s 
validity, whereas long-term coaching would reduce validity.  However, little if any 
research has drawn this nuanced distinction between practice and learning, and the 
present study does not draw this distinction either, but instead focuses on investigating 
the more fundamental learning and memory explanation for the retesting effect.   
In either case, if the retesting effect meaningfully increases test-takers’ standing 
on the construct of interest, then retesting allows an organization to make more informed 
decisions regarding the test-takers’ true standing on the construct of interest (Lievens et 
al., 2005).  Conversely, if retest scores are not as valid as initial test scores, but instead 
reflect memory of the previous test administration, then allowing retesting may result in 
the selection of less qualified workers and ultimately reduce organizational effectiveness 
(Van Iddekinge et al., 2011).  Although it is clear that test users wish to make the best 
use of the inferences drawn from test scores, it is not necessarily apparent whether retest 
scores reflect enhanced validity (i.e., learning) or score increases confounded with 





3.4 Reducing Measurement Error 
Organizations may also permit retesting under the assumption that an 
individual’s initial assessment was subject to heterogeneous and random measurement 
error; that is, some transient characteristics of the test-taker or the testing environment 
contaminated test scores but may or may not be present upon a secondary assessment 
(Lievens et al., 2005).  For example, test-taker’s mood, illness, or distraction, or the 
nuances in the test’s administration may affect an individual test-taker’s performance.  
Under the assumption that the operational validity of the particular test-taker’s initial 
test score is somehow contaminated due to this random error, organizations may allow a 
retest where this random error is less likely to be present (true, or not).  The primary 
influences of measurement error in interpreting retesting scores have been investigated 
in the context of regression to the mean. 
In operational settings, typically only the test-takers who were not selected (i.e., 
test-takers who performed poorly) will retest because the test-takers who performed well 
are selected and do not retest.  Thus, in operational contexts, disproportionately lower 
performing test-takers than the initial test-taking pool will retest while higher performing 
test-takers (who were selected) will not.  Consequently, the assumed regression to the 
mean is upward (i.e., an increase in test scores) because it is the lower-performing test-
takers who upon retesting, are improving their scores.  Furthermore, Lievens et al. 
(2005) found some evidence that individuals who scored particularly low on an initial 
test were more likely to retest.  Thus, retest applicant pools will invariably contain fewer 
test-takers than the initial test-taking pool and a greater proportion of lower-performing 
 13 
 
test-takers, potentially leading to scores regressing to the mean.  It is well documented 
that regression to the mean can affect the inferences that researchers and practitioners are 
able to draw from test scores across administrations (e.g., Bobko, 2001; Hausknecht et 
al., 2007; Hunter, Schmidt, & Le, 2006; Lievens et al., 2005; Roth, Van Iddekinge, 
Huffcutt, Eidson, & Bobko, 2002). 
In summary, these four motivations for implementing a particular retesting policy 
rest on diverse assumptions and values reflecting organizational concerns.  These 
motivations are important as retesting policy could result in awarding credentials, jobs, 
and promotions to unqualified individuals and therefore may have significant 
consequences for test-takers, organizations, and society at large (Millman, 1989).  
Although organizations and policy-makers are clearly not of any singular motivation, 
retesting policy decisions would be more scientifically defensible if made with a greater 
understanding as to whether the retesting effect is best explained by learning or memory 




4. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE RETESTING EFFECT: LEARNING OR 
MEMORY EFFECTS?  
“It is one thing, however, to remember, another to know.” Seneca (p. 80, Campbell, 
1969) 
The finding that practicing one type of material improves performance on similar 
material extends back over a hundred years to psychology’s earliest pioneers (James, 
1890; Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901).  These findings were not interpreted merely as 
an effect of memory, but immediately recognized as a potentially useful tool for 
learning.  As early as 1906, Edward Thorndike proposed that “the active recall of a fact 
from within is, as a rule, better than its impression from without” (p. 123, Thorndike, 
1906).  Since Abbott’s (1909) seminal study, several hundred experiments consistently 
demonstrated that testing enhances learning and retention (for recent reviews, see 
Rawson & Dunlosky, 2011; Roediger & Butler, 2011; Roediger, Putnam, & Smith, 
2011).  Nevertheless, mean score increases upon retest also occur across constructs by 
which learning and retention would not be expected (i.e., abilities), leading to concerns 
about precisely what process may underlie the retesting effect.  More than 50 years ago, 
personnel researchers questioned the value of retesting applicants’ necessary skills and 
abilities in personnel selection (van der Reis, 1963).  Similarly, researchers in 
educational settings have questioned the interpretation of retest scores since the early 
1920s (e.g., Richardson & Robinson, 1921).   
The two lines of inquiry investigating the retesting effect as reflecting either 
learning or memory have proceeded in parallel for some time.  Concomitantly, personnel 
researchers have more frequently investigated abilities, whereas cognitive and 
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educational psychologists have more frequently investigated memory and knowledge, 
resulting in segregated streams of research.  In the absence of integrated research across 
constructs and fields of study, knowledge retest increases are commonly assumed to 
reflect learning, whereas ability retest increases are assumed to reflect memory, and thus, 
a source of measurement error.  However, there is no reason why these two theoretically 
competing explanations cannot be conceptually crossed.  In an effort to bridge this gap 
in the literature, this dissertation focused on advancing the literature of the retesting 
effect by investigating both explanations simultaneously.   
The strongest evidence for learning is the generalizability of score increases of 
the assessed construct across different settings (Jensen, 1998).  In cognitive psychology, 
transfer is the term used to refer to score gains that occur after initial exposure to a 
stimulus that are subsequently reflected across novel operationalizations, settings, and 
tasks to which a test-taker has not been previously exposed (Carpenter, 2012; Jensen, 
1998).  The transfer of ability and knowledge to these novel settings reflects learning, as 
ultimately, the underlying ability and knowledge measured by these tests must be 
utilized in contexts different from those in which they were originally assessed or 
acquired (Carpenter, 2012).  In terms of transfer, learning refers to an increase in test 
scores that reflect an increase in the underlying construct which transfers across 
operationalizations, settings, and tasks.  Conversely, memory effects refer to an increase 
in the specific test score that does not transfer across operationalizations, settings, and 
tasks (Anastasi, 1981).   
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Transfer is a broad term and numerous taxonomies exist.  For example, Barnett 
and Ceci (2002) propose a taxonomy of evidence of the retesting effect as reflecting 
learning through transfer across temporal contexts, test formats, and test construct 
domains.  Transfer may also be conceptualized in terms of near or far transfer.  Near 
transfer occurs when a rule or concept from a domain is applied to a new item from the 
same domain (Chen & Klahr, 1999) and far transfer occurs when a rule or concept is 
applied in a novel domain or context but requires a similar underlying solution (Gick & 
Holyoak, 1980).   
Despite extensive research on the generality of the retesting effect, little research 
exists regarding the benefits of initial testing in transferring to novel contexts across 
time, test forms, construct domains, and external criteria (Carpenter, 2012); and there is 
also limited theory as to why retesting improves learning across both constructs and 
fields of study (Dunlosky et al., 2013).  In the absence of integrated research across 
constructs and research disciplines, it is difficult to demonstrate whether retesting 
facilitates learning or memory because it is unclear whether these retesting effect 
explanations are confounded by the particular constructs investigated within these 
respective fields.   
4.1 Learning Effects 
In terms of the retesting effect, learning refers to an increase in test scores that 
reflect an underlying increase in the psychological construct of interest that is due to the 
intervention of testing itself (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a), and is manifested through 
transfer across settings, time, and test operationalizations (Carpenter, 2012).  Thus, the 
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learning explanation posits that score increases upon retest are equally, if not more valid 
assessments of the construct since they reflect a true construct increase due to the initial 
testing providing the opportunity to improve on the underlying construct domain.   
The retesting effect on knowledge tests is a historically robust phenomenon in 
both the education and cognitive psychology literatures, consistently showing evidence 
that testing itself facilitates knowledge by modifying and organizing existing memories, 
and developing greater retrieval of memories (Abbott, 1909; Bjork & Bjork, 1992; 
Gates, 1917; Hunt, 2006; Karpicke & Roediger, 2008; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a; 
Spitzer, 1939).  Little work, however, has investigated the processes by which retesting 
may affect abilities and furthermore, whether these increases reflect learning or memory 
effects.  Nevertheless, tests that require reasoning and the manipulation of knowledge 
appear to facilitate learning to a greater extent than memory recall tests (Chan, 
McDermott, & Roediger, 2006; Hamaker, 1986).  Thus, it is not unreasonable to posit 
that the retesting effect may increase both knowledge and ability.   
The principal cognitive explanation for the retesting effect is spreading activation 
theory (Bjork & Bjork, 1992; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Little, Bjork, Bjork, & Angello, 
2012; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a).  Spreading activation theory models human 
cognition in terms of an interrelated network of concepts (Bjork & Bjork, 1992; Collins 
& Loftus, 1975).  Concepts are commonly represented as nodes in a network, where the 
properties of all concepts are represented as relational links between the nodes of other 
concepts (Collins & Loftus, 1975). Nodes that are more closely related are more easily 
retrieved.  Thus, when a stimulus is presented (i.e., primed), the concepts most closely 
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related to that stimulus are activated throughout the network, priming the recollection of 
related information within the network (Bjork & Bjork, 1992; Collins & Loftus, 1975).  
Furthermore, practice retrieving information from memory (e.g., through testing) 
improves the ability to recall both initially encoded information and related nodes in the 
future (Bjork & Bjork, 1992; Little et al., 2012).  Spreading activation theory has 
primarily been used to explain the retesting effect in terms of learning; however, this 
explanation also covaries with the construct investigated (i.e., knowledge) and fields of 
study (i.e., cognitive psychology).  Although spreading activation theory has been 
primarily used to explain the retesting effect under these boundary conditions, it 
nevertheless offers a viable alternate explanation to memory in ability domains as well. 
Previous empirical research, which is discussed further below, presents diverse 
forms of evidence suggesting that the act of testing itself results in learning the 
underlying construct.  Broadly, initial testing facilitates learning to a greater extent than 
traditional learning methods, transfers beyond test-specific information, transfers to 
increasingly complex conceptualizations of the construct domain, occurs (although at 
different magnitudes) across both knowledge and ability domains, and transfers to 
external criteria in both academic and applied settings.  
4.1.1 Learning Effects in Laboratory Settings.  Retesting consistently 
produces test score increases and enhances retention greater than traditional learning 
methods, such as additional studying (Chan et al., 2006; Karpicke & Blunt, 2011; 
Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a).  In fact, the retesting effect produces retest score gains 
beyond that of even test-takers’ own expectations, as it is consistently found that 
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initially, test-takers do not anticipate that retesting will improve performance greater 
than additional studying (Karpicke & Blunt, 2011; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a). 
The retesting effect is not confined to simply remembering the previous test 
experience and repeating responses.  Test-takers do, in fact, change their responses 
following initial testing.  Also, this response-changing is not merely confined to recalled 
guesses, confidence in previously incorrect responses, or even previously successful 
retrieval attempts (Kang, Pashler, Cepeda, Rohrer, Carpenter, & Mozer, 2011; Kornell, 
Hays, & Bjork, 2009).   
The retesting effect is also not confined to the similarity or simplicity of 
particular response formats, but also occurs across response formats, increasingly 
abstract content, and complex skills.  In fact, initial tests that are more difficult to 
remember or require higher-level comprehension of the construct, such as recall and 
constructed-response items, result in greater retesting effects than recognition tests 
(McDaniel, Roediger, & McDermott, 2007).  Retest score increases also occur on 
higher-level comprehension items, including short-answer application and multiple-
choice, inference-based items (e.g., Agarwal & Roediger, 2011; Butler, 2010; Johnson & 
Mayer, 2009).  Retest score increases have also been shown on tests that require higher-
level inferences and the application of previously learned information to new settings or 
problems (Agarwal & Roediger, 2011; Butler, 2010; Foos & Fisher, 1988; Johnson & 
Mayer, 2009; Karpicke & Blunt, 2011; McDaniel, Howard, & Einstein, 2009).  These 
increases even occur when the retests included different items or test forms than initial 
testing (Karpicke & Blunt, 2011).  Retesting increases even occur for abstract tasks, such 
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as inductive function learning tasks (Kang, McDaniel, & Pashler, 2011) as well as more 
complex skills, such as resuscitation procedures (Kromann, Jensen, & Ringsted, 2009).     
Retest increases are also not bound to only test-specific information, but transfer 
even to related yet previously untested content (Chan et al., 2006; Karpicke & Blunt, 
2011; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a).  That is, the retesting effect is stronger when test 
content is interrelated and retested as opposed to unrelated content (i.e., arbitrarily 
grouped test content) and retested.  Furthermore, test-takers exhibit greater retest gains 
on related knowledge even when that particular knowledge was not directly tested on the 
initial test.  Thus, retest performance increases do not appear to be the result of the mere 
exposure to test items (Chan et al., 2006).  Instead, retesting appears to develop the 
underlying construct domain even when no direct memory effects are possible (i.e., 
retest items are not repeated from initial test).  From the laboratory research presented 
above, it is clearly plausible that initial testing not only measures, but also develops the 
specified construct domain as reflected by increased retest scores.   
4.1.2 Learning Effects in Operational Settings.  The retesting effect extends 
beyond lab settings into operational settings in both academic and organizational 
employment settings.  These learning effects also occur across both knowledge and 
ability domains in the prediction of external criteria.  Of particular relevance to learning, 
the literature also demonstrates some preliminary evidence that the retesting effect not 
only increases retest performance, but may in fact enhance the criterion-related validity 
of retests.  Although the retesting effect is often conceptualized as mean increases in 
test-scores that reflects error (i.e., memory effects), this increase in the criterion-related 
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validity of retests raises question as to whether this reflects the retest capturing some 
additional variance in the underlying construct (i.e., learning), or the reduction of some 
other confounding error that initially suppressed test scores.  Nevertheless, this evidence 
is mixed and difficult to parse out from memory effects in the absence of experimental 
designs and criterion-related validity data.  
Research has consistently demonstrated that the retesting effect on knowledge 
tests extends outside lab settings to long-term educational settings and classroom 
materials (Carpenter, Pashler, & Cepeda, 2009; Cranney, Ahn, McKinnon, Morris, & 
Watts, 2009; Glass & Sinha, 2013; Kromann et al., 2009; Metcalfe, Kornell, & Son, 
2007; Rawson & Dunlosky, 2011; Rees, 1986; Vojdanoska, Cranney, & Newell, 2010).  
In fact, the retesting effect also exhibits significant gains even after summative course 
assessments (Balch, 1998; Daniel & Broida, 2004; Lyle & Crawford, 2011; McDaniel, 
Agarwal, Huelser, McDermott, & Roediger, 2011; McDaniel, Anderson, Derbish, & 
Morrisette, 2007; McDaniel, Wildman, & Anderson, 2012).  While these studies 
primarily investigated the retesting effect using formal educational materials and 
younger samples, evidence indicates that the retesting effect occurs at a similar 
magnitude across age groups, including primary, secondary, and undergraduate 
education, and from mid- to late age (Meyer & Logan, 2013). 
Retest score increases also occur in applied selection contexts on both knowledge 
and ability tests.  Lievens et al. (2005) reported a retesting effect d of 0.27 for scores on 
a test of science knowledge used to assess medical school applicants.  Similarly, 
candidates who chose to retest on a job knowledge test improved their scores by almost a 
 22 
 
full standard deviation (d = 0.93, Van Iddekinge et al., 2011).  Schleicher et al. (2010) 
reported a retest increase d of 0.15 on a job-knowledge test used to select applicants for 
professional jobs within a federal agency.  Raymond et al. (2007) found even larger 
increases on two certification tests completed by medical imaging workers (d = 0.79 and 
0.48).  Similarly, in the ability domain, Hausknecht et al.’s (2007) meta-analysis 
reported a retesting effect d of 0.26 across ability measures in selection settings. 
Retest score increases occur consistently across diverse constructs and settings; 
however, it is less clear whether these retest score increases consistently reflect learning 
effects.  So, mean score increases upon retest do not necessarily imply learning, as 
increases may still in fact reflect memory effects.  There is mixed evidence in both 
academic and selection contexts, across both ability and knowledge tests, that second 
administrations of tests exhibit higher scores in addition to displaying equal if not 
greater criterion-related validity.  Although some differences between validity 
coefficients were not significant, increasing validity coefficients are not a necessary 
condition to demonstrate evidence of learning.  That is, mean retest score increases with 
no concomitant change in criterion-related validity would still provide evidence of 
learning.  However, the opposite—a significant retest score increase coupled with a 
significant decrease in validity coefficients—would more clearly indicate the 
contaminating influence of memory on retest scores.  
Research within academic settings has found that secondary test scores are 
sometimes better predictors of academic criteria than initial test scores, although 
differences between initial and retest validity are often small (e.g., Allalouf & Ben-
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Shakhar, 1998; Coyle, 2006; Lievens et al., 2005, 2007; Reeve & Lam, 2005).  Within 
academic settings, ability retest score increases are common while criterion-related 
validity increases or stays the same (Allalouf & Ben-Shakhar, 1998; Coyle, 2006).  For 
example, ability retest scores correlated more highly with college matriculation exam 
scores than did initial test scores (Allalouf & Ben-Shakhar, 1998), and retest scores on 
the SAT correlated more highly with college grade point average than initial SAT scores 
correlated with college grade point average (GPA, r = .54 versus r = .50, respectively; 
although these two validities were not significantly different; Coyle, 2006). 
Higher validity coefficients for retest scores are not confined to academic 
settings.  For example, in a sample of law enforcement applicants, Hausknecht et al. 
(2002) found evidence that the second administration of a GMA test showed greater, 
although not significantly greater, criterion-related validity coefficients with training 
performance than initial scores (e.g., r = .31 versus .27, respectively [limited only to 
applicants who chose to retest]).  Similarly, Lievens et al. (2005) found that medical 
school applicants’ retest scores on a science-knowledge test were significantly more 
predictive of subsequent grade point average than initial test scores (r = .21 versus .11; 
limited only to applicants who chose  to retest).  Similarly, Van Iddekinge et al. (2011) 
found that a second job knowledge-test exhibited considerably greater prediction of job 
performance (r = .38 vs. .27; limited only to applicants who chose to retest), and more 
generally, that second administration scores were comparable in criterion-related validity 
when evaluated against numerous alternate operationalizations (i.e., most recent test 
scores, highest test scores, or the mean of initial and retest scores). 
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Thus, research in both laboratory and operational settings demonstrate that retest 
increases occur across response formats, test forms, and that these retest scores predict 
relevant external criteria.  Nevertheless, little research has directly pitted this learning 
explanation against memory in laboratory or operational settings. 
4.2 Memory Effects 
One cannot assume that retest score increases necessarily reflect learning, as 
numerous alternate explanations exist.  Even when test-takers participate in construct-
focused training, coaching, or practice, researchers agree that retest score increases are 
not necessarily indicative of increases in the underlying construct (Cole, 1982; Snow, 
1982; Sternberg, Ketron, & Powell, 1982).  Instead, researchers posit that score increases 
may reflect any number of heterogeneous influences interacting with the retesting 
process to increase observed test scores (Anastasi, 1981; Hausknecht et al., 2007; 
Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2001).  Although varied influences exist (and will be 
discussed further later), the most likely alternate explanation for the retesting effect is 
memory.   
Memory effects occur when the memory of the initial testing process influences 
only the observed test score upwards, rather than develops the underlying construct 
(Anastasi, 1981).  In comparison to learning effects, memory effects increase the test-
taker’s observed test score with no concomitant change in the individual’s true score or 
standing on the construct of interest.  Thus, the memory effect explanation would posit 
that the observed score increases upon retesting do not reflect learning, but memory of 
the previous test administration.  Support for the memory explanation of the retesting 
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effect includes reduction in the test’s construct-related validity, lack of generalization to 
convergent measures, weaker criterion-related validity, and retest scores’ correlations 
with memory-related constructs (e.g., working memory capacity) that are unrelated to a 
test’s focal construct.  
4.2.1 Memory Effects in Laboratory Settings.  Some researchers present 
evidence that second administrations of ability tests do not assess the construct in the 
same way as initial testing (Matton et al., 2011; Reeve & Lam, 2005), and may instead 
reflect contamination by memory (Lievens et al., 2007).  Memory effects may 
alternatively explain retest increases by a single general, homogenous factor reflecting 
memory of the initial testing experience (Anastasi, 1981; Lievens et al., 2007).  
Accordingly, Matton et al. (2009) found that a single factor could account for the 
retesting effect across a battery of diverse ability measures despite an absence of a 
relationship with the other factors.  Matton et al. (2009) concluded that this single factor 
may reflect a reliable, yet independent, measurement artifact inherent to all retesting that 
consistently increases test scores across diverse constructs.  Similar to this single factor 
explanation, Lievens et al. (2007) found that second administrations of a variety of 
ability tests were significantly correlated with a memory association test (r = .29), 
whereas initial test scores were not (r = .03).   
If the retesting effect actually develops the underlying construct, as the 
proponents of using testing as a learning intervention posit, then it appears unlikely that 
these learning benefits for retested content would decline over time (see Roediger & 
Karpicke, 2006a, for a review).  Conversely, if the retesting effect is due to memory, 
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increases are likely to dissipate over time as memories of previous test responses decay.  
Following this prediction, meta-analytic evidence shows the retesting effect for abilities 
diminish over greater time intervals between administrations (Hausknecht et al., 2007).  
These results follow the pattern of memory, not learning.  
Initial testing may provide test-takers the opportunity to remember test-specific 
information; that is, test-takers may remember previous items and responses rather than 
actively responding to items, as would reflect the assessed construct (Kulik et al., 1984).  
Even within cognitively loaded reasoning tasks, sufficient practice results in 
overlearning which reduces the g-saturation of these tasks (Ackerman, 1987).  
Specifically, it appears that initial testing promotes the use of algorithms, heuristics, or 
rule-applying behavior that may be reproduced upon retest, rather than reflecting the 
underlying construct (te Nijenhuis, Voskuijl, & Schijve, 2001).  That is, testing provides 
the opportunity for test-takers to develop and practice test-specific, short-cut strategies 
that reduce the cognitive efforts required and therefore, improve performance without a 
concomitant increase in the underlying construct (Neubauer & Freudenthaler, 1994; 
Roberts & Newton, 2003).  One may also posit that the memory of these strategies 
would allow test-takers to quickly complete the elementary tasks of responding to items, 
gaining additional test-taking time to complete other items which were not previously 
successfully or correctly completed.   
If the retesting effect ultimately reflects learning, then interventions designed to 
increase the underlying construct should be generalizable such that they are also 
reflected in score increases on alternate operationalizations of the same construct.  
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Although testing may act as an intervention to facilitate learning, and mean score 
increases consistently occur upon retesting, little evidence suggests that these retest 
increases transfer across tests assessing even the same construct (te Nijenhuis, van 
Vianen, & van der Flier, 2007).  In fact, the magnitude of the retesting effect is greatest 
on tests with the lowest ability loadings at both the item- (te Nijenhuis et al., 2007) and 
the test-level (Jensen, 1998).  For example, retests of ability exhibit less g-saturation and 
lower convergent validity with alternate ability operationalizations (Jensen, 1998; 
Lievens et al., 2007; Matton et al., 2011).  Thus, this literature would suggest that the 
retesting effect leads to score improvement through the influence of unrelated constructs, 
such as memory of test-specific information and previous responses that contaminate 
and increase scores upon retest.  
4.2.2 Memory Effects in Operational Settings.  Although retest score increases 
are robust across constructs and settings, the evidence pertaining to criterion-related 
validity is less consistent.  That is, some research in applied settings indicates that the 
criterion-related validity of retests is significantly higher than initial tests, including both 
ability (Embretson, 1987) and knowledge (e.g., Lievens et al., 2005; Van Iddekinge et al. 
2011).  Conversely, other research in applied settings indicates that the criterion-related 
validity of retests is significantly lower than initial tests (e.g., Hausknecht et al., 2002; 
Lievens et al., 2005; Lievens et al., 2007).  The criterion-related validity of these tests 
rests on their capacity to measure the underlying construct (Ree, Earles, & Teachout 
1994; Ree & Earles 1991), thus a decrease in the construct-related validity of the 
measure and an increase in contaminating constructs (i.e., memory) would reduce the 
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measure’s criterion-related validity as well (te Nijenhuis et al., 2001).  If retest scores 
increase with a concomitant decrease in criterion-related validity in operational settings, 
then it appears more likely that this reflects memory of initial testing rather than learning 




5. THE PRESENT STUDY 
This dissertation undertakes a comparative investigation of the two explanatory 
processes for the retesting effect, that is, whether retest score gains reflect learning or 
memory.  Consequently, the primary objective of this dissertation is a competitive test of 
learning or memory as the best explanation for the retesting effect.  To disentangle these 
competing explanations, this study’s design assesses and demonstrates the magnitude 
and pattern of relationships associated with the retesting effect as reflecting either 
learning or memory.   Therefore, an initial goal is a replication of the retesting effect, 
which in turn, provides a baseline that permits the competitive test of these explanations.  
However, to investigate these two competing explanations, it is first necessary to control 
for the effects of memory of test-specific material while allowing test-takers the 
opportunity to learn the underlying construct.  To accomplish this, the test forms were 
manipulated.      
5.1 Investigating the Retesting Effect using Alternate Test Forms 
Explicating the role of learning versus memory is ultimately tested by the 
transfer and broad generalizability of score increases across operationalizations of the 
construct of interest (Carpenter, 2012).  Accordingly, many researchers have called for 
investigations of the retesting effect using alternate test forms (Lievens et al., 2007).  
Memory of previous test information (e.g., previous responses) relies on test-specific 
information, whereas learning reflects true construct gains that extend beyond particular 
operationalizations.  By extension, minimizing the test-specific information between test 
and retest by using alternate forms is often recommended as a method to reduce the test-
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specific overlap between test administrations, and therefore reduce the confounding 
influence of memory on subsequent administrations (Shadish et al., 2001).   
Although there are various practical reasons for developing alternate forms (e.g., 
changes in the underlying content domain, test security), educational institutions and 
organizations often develop and administer alternate test forms under the belief that this 
prevents the purposeful (i.e., a breach in test security) or inadvertent influence of 
memory of test-specific information from contaminating tests’ construct- and criterion-
related validity (Geving et al., 2005; Hausknecht et al., 2007; Wendt & Harris, 2004).  
Alternate test forms do significantly reduce the magnitude of retest score gains but do 
not entirely eliminate the retesting effect.  For instance, meta-analytic research supports 
the fact that significant retest score gains still occur even with the use of alternate test 
forms.  Specifically, Kulik et al. (1984) computed effect sizes from over 40 studies 
involving retest score gains on both ability and knowledge tests, finding that score 
increases are substantively greater on the same form (d = 0.42) than alternate forms (d = 
0.23).  In the absence of test-takers’ ability to remember test-specific information, the 
remaining score increase on alternate form retests are presumed to reflect learning 
instead. 
Retest increases occur across alternate forms and extend to increasingly complex 
test content.  For example, testing facilitates memory classification and organization 
(e.g., bird types, families); even when new examples are introduced within the learned 
categories (Jacoby, Walheim, & Coane, 2010).  Testing also facilitates transferring 
previously learned problems to novel, never before-seen material within similar domains 
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(e.g., testing versus restudying math rules/relationships, Kang et al., 2011).  Initial 
testing was also found to be superior to additional studying in the ability to draw 
inferences from previously learned material, even when the inferences about the domain 
were quite different (e.g., the underlying structure of bird and bat wings compared to 
aircraft; Butler, 2010; see also Karpicke & Blunt, 2011).   
Investigating the competing explanations of learning and memory requires the 
use of alternate forms, as these explanations are confounded when using only retest 
score increases from the same test forms.  Therefore, the present study manipulates test 
forms to eliminate test-specific overlap and therefore controls for the influence of 
memory, which in turn, permits a test for learning as an explanation for the retesting 
effect.  If learning underlies the retesting effect, then alternate forms should not greatly 
reduce score increases upon retest or significantly alter the pattern of results.  However, 
if memory effects best explain almost all score gains, then alternate forms should 
substantially reduce if not eliminate the ability of test-takers to utilize test-specific 
information and therefore eliminate the score gains associated with the retesting effect.  
As such, alternate test forms were used to competitively test for memory and learning as 
best accounting for the retesting effect across both ability and knowledge tests.  This was 
also accomplished in conjunction with a manipulation of corrective feedback.   
In light of the extensive literature on the retesting effect previously reviewed, as 
prerequisite hypotheses, if memory best accounts for the retesting effect, then:    
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Hypothesis 1a: Retest scores will be higher than initial scores; however, the 
magnitude of this effect will be larger on the same form retest than the alternate 
form retest. 
However, if learning best accounts for the retesting effect, then: 
Hypothesis 1b: Retest scores will be higher than initial test scores and the 
magnitude of this effect will be similar for both the same and alternate form 
retests.   
5.2 Investigating the Retesting Effect using Item Response Time  
The cognitive process underlying learning and memory effects upon retest are 
likely to be reflected by differences in the speed of processing and response production 
between initial and retest performance.  Item response time reflects the cognitive 
processing speed that test-takers take between the initial item’s cue and their production 
of the item’s response.   
Memory effects likely reflect a simpler production process upon retest than 
learning.  That is, test-takers do not require time to process, solve, and subsequently 
respond to the item, but are instead responding to the item’s cue from memory.  Initial 
testing provides test-takers practice to develop, remember, and use test-specific, short-
cut strategies to quickly complete the elementary tasks of retest items faster, despite no 
concomitant increase in the underlying construct (Ackerman, 1987, 1988; Neubauer & 
Freudenthaler, 1994; Roberts & Newton, 2003).  Test-takers may retain test-specific 
information from initial testing that allows a previous response to be identified (Webb, 
Pridemore, Stock, Kulhavy, & Henning, 1997).  Accordingly, this is often reflected in 
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faster response times; test-takers spend less time processing items that they previously 
answered (e.g., Stock, Kulhavy, Pridemore, & Krug, 1992; Webb, Stock, Kulhavy, & 
White, 1990; Webb, Stock, & McCarthy, 1994).  A number of researchers have found 
that speeded and psychomotor-loaded tests exhibit larger retest increases, potentially 
reflecting that remembering previous responses allows test-takers to quickly respond 
(Burke, 1997; Larson & Alderton, 1997).  Thus, if retest score increases are the result of 
memory rather than learning, then test-takers recall previous responses and the strategies 
that they previously used to quickly produce a response.  
However, following from the premise that response latency reflects the depth of 
cognitive processing that differentiates memory from learning effects, alternate test 
forms eliminate test-takers’ ability to remember test-specific information.  That is, test-
takers completing an alternate form retest have no previous item-specific responses to 
remember, and subsequently, respond to items faster.  Test-takers cannot quickly 
retrieve item- or test-information from memory as alternate test forms comprise novel 
test information and thus require original processing (Webb et al., 1997).  As memory 
effects are controlled, and any retest score increases presumably reflect learning, then 
test-takers must still cognitively process an item before responding.  Thus, test-takers 
with faster response times on a second test administration are likely remembering 
previous responses (reflecting memory effects), whereas test-takers with slower response 
times are likely taking additional time to cognitively process an item upon retest.  
Accordingly, Raymond et al. (2007) found shorter response times for the same-form 
knowledge test compared to alternate-form knowledge tests (although, not significant 
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differences in the magnitude of test scores).  Similarly, Powers (1986) found that ability 
retest score increases were positively related to the response time allotted per item.  If 
learning effects underlie the retesting effect, then test-takers must still process the novel, 
alternate form item before responding.  Thus, alternate forms versus the same form will 
exhibit little difference between response times if learning underlies the retesting effect.  
On the other hand, if memory effects underlie the retesting effect, then test-takers cannot 
use test-specific information and will require greater time to process and respond to 
novel items.  Thus, if memory best accounts for the retesting effect, then: 
Hypothesis 2a: Retest response times will be faster than initial test response 
times. However, the magnitude of the difference between the initial and retest 
response times will be larger on the same form retest than the alternate form 
retest. 
However, if learning best accounts for the retesting effect, then: 
Hypothesis 2b: Retest response times will be faster than initial test response 
times.  However, the magnitude of the difference between the initial and retest 
response time for the same and alternate form retest will be small (i.e., similar). 
5.3 Investigating the Retesting Effect by Construct Domain 
Although the retesting effect occurs across ability and knowledge domains 
(Kulik et al., 1984), past explanations for the retesting effect have been embedded in 
research literatures that covary with these constructs.  Thus, in the absence of 
competitive investigations using both ability and knowledge tests, it is unclear whether 
retest score increases are the result of learning or memory as these explanations are 
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confounded with the construct domain (i.e., explaining ability retest increases in terms of 
memory and knowledge tests in terms of learning).  Furthermore, using both ability and 
knowledge tests permits the comparative examination of learning and memory as 
explanations for the retesting effect.  Specifically, whereas it is true that knowledge tests 
are widely used in personnel selection and ability tests are widely used in cognitive 
psychology and education, selection researchers still invoke the error variance 
explanation for knowledge tests and education and cognitive psychology researchers are 
relatively silent on the interpretation of retest scores on ability tests.  Thus, there remains 
the question of why a learning explanation would hold for knowledge but not ability 
tests, especially in light of research supporting the effectives of practice in skill and 
knowledge acquisition (Arthur, Day, Bennett, & Portrey, 2013).   
Researchers posit that test construct domain interacts with the retesting process in 
some way (Greene, 1941; Kingston & Turner, 1984; Raymond et al., 2007; Wing, 1980).  
Abilities, as fundamentally stable and enduring characteristics of individuals (Deary, 
Pattie, & Starr, 2013), are less likely to be affected by learning interventions (Skuy, 
Gewer, Osrin, Khunou, Fridjon, & Rushton, 2002).  Conversely, knowledge is malleable 
and is therefore more likely to be affected by learning interventions.  This is possibly 
due to the finding that the retesting effect is greater when test items can be answered by 
the systematic application of general problem solving skills, whereas the observed 
retesting effect is smaller for items that require application of previously acquired, 
domain-specific knowledge (Kingston & Turner, 1984; Wing, 1980).  Item types that are 
“most subject to practice [learning] effects are those used to assess fluid as opposed to 
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crystallized intelligence” (p. 153, Wing, 1980). Although both the learning and memory 
explanations may account for retest score increases across both construct domains, the 
magnitude of these influences are likely to differ by construct domain. 
 In accordance with this prediction, the criterion-related validity of knowledge 
tests appears to increase upon retesting (e.g., Van Iddekinge et al., 2011), whereas the 
criterion-related validity of ability tests often decreases (e.g., Lievens et al., 2005).  
Specifically, Lievens et al. (2005) found that while both knowledge and ability test 
scores increased, their criterion-related validity diverged, such that ability retest scores’ 
criterion-related validity decreased whereas the knowledge retest scores’ criterion-
related validity stayed the same.  
Drawing from this literature, researchers and practitioners commonly assume that 
score increases on ability retests over short retest intervals or without substantive 
training interventions are more likely to reflect memory, not learning.  Thus, following 
the design of Lievens et al. (2005), ability and knowledge were contrasted in the present 
study.  In comparison with knowledge, ability, specifically GMA, is less likely to 
meaningfully increase over short time periods simply due to the initial test acting as a 
learning intervention.  Conversely, knowledge appears more likely to develop from 
testing.  Thus, if testing functions as a learning intervention that develops the underlying 
construct, then knowledge tests are likely to be influenced to a greater extent than ability 
tests.   
As previously detailed, alternate test forms offer the ability to parse out the 
influence of test-takers remembering test-specific information (memory effects) from 
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learning.  Thus, manipulating alternate test forms in conjunction with varying the degree 
to which the construct domain is amenable to intervention (i.e., ability versus 
knowledge), offered a research paradigm that permitted a competitive test of whether 
learning or memory best accounts for the retesting effect.     
5.3.1 Ability.  The term ability is used to describe a relatively broad and 
enduring capability that an individual uses to learn and perform a task and that differs 
between individuals (Ackerman, 1987, 1988; Lubinski, 2000).  For the purposes of the 
present study, GMA was used as an exemplar of ability testing in general.  GMA is 
associated with the ability to process, understand, and learn information (Jensen, 1998; 
Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) and is commonly used to differentiate between test-takers in 
both educational and organizational contexts (Lubinski, 2000; Vandenberg & Lance, 
2000).  Extensive research supports the stability of GMA over time (Carroll, 1993; 
Gottfredson, 1986).  Specifically, research shows that GMA is stable after early 
adolescence (Dixon, Kramer, & Baltes, 1985; Jensen, 1998) and into late adulthood 
(Deary et al., 2013).  Furthermore, even deliberate, construct-focused, learning 
interventions aimed at increasing GMA do not generalize to alternate test forms 
assessing the same construct or external criteria (Skuy et al., 2002).    
Nevertheless, the retesting effect on ability tests in general (and GMA 
specifically) are consistent, robust, and occur across organizational (e.g., Hausknecht et 
al., 2002), educational (e.g., Powers & Rock, 1999), clinical (e.g., Basso, Carona, 
Lowery, & Axelrod, 2002), and research settings (e.g., Woehlke & Wilder, 1963).  
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Furthermore, the retesting effect also occurs on alternate ability test forms, permitting 
the possibility that these retest score increases reflect learning, not only memory effects. 
Meta-analytic evidence indicates that ability tests show evidence of the retesting 
effect across alternate forms, although at a reduced magnitude compared to same forms 
(d = 0.22 compared to d = 0.40, respectively; Hausknecht et al., 2007).  Hausknecht et 
al. (2007) also found that the magnitude of the retesting effect on same form ability tests 
diminished over time.  However, it is interesting to note that there was no relationship 
between retest interval and the retesting effect increases when test-takers took alternate 
forms.  That is, although retest increases dissipated over time on the same test form (as 
would be predicted by memory), the retest increases did not dissipate over time for the 
alternate test form (as would be predicted by learning).  These findings suggest that 
retesting with the same form leads to test score increases due to memory effects, but 
does not refute the possibility of learning effects across same and alternate forms (albeit 
at a smaller magnitude).  In contrast, some evidence indicates that test-takers with 
previous experience of an alternate form of an ability test do not perform any better than 
those who initially completed the alternate form (Matton et al., 2011).  Thus, it is 
possible that some research utilizing alternate test forms reflect differences between 
alternate test forms that were not psychometrically equivalent and therefore confound 
comparison.  So, in the proposed study, GMA was selected as a stable, ability construct 
that is comparatively less likely to be influenced by learning, as opposed to knowledge 
which is likely more amenable to learning interventions. 
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5.3.2 Knowledge.  Knowledge reflects a specific body of information, be it 
factual information (declarative) or the steps, techniques, and organization for 
implementing information (procedural) in the successful performance of a task (Dye et 
al., 1993).  Although knowledge may be influenced by the abilities necessary to learn, 
retain, and retrieve it (e.g., GMA, Schmidt, Hunter, & Outerbridge, 1986), knowledge is 
domain-specific and may reflect numerous and diverse bodies of information.  
For knowledge tests, transfer occurs across varying degrees of overlap in test 
content.  Although equivalent alternate forms for knowledge retests have not been 
commonly examined, the retesting effect on knowledge tests occurs across 
operationalizations assessing similar knowledge without test-specific overlap.  
Generally, it appears that initial testing influences score increases for later retests, yet 
changes in the subsequent retest form do not appear to entirely remove retest increases 
(Carpenter, 2009; 2011; Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006).  For example, an increasing 
number of studies have shown that retesting increases occur on knowledge tests even 
when the specific test content was not initially tested, but related to content from 
previous tests (Chan, 2009, 2010; Chan et al., 2006; Cranney et al., 2009).  Thus, testing 
appears to develop test-takers ability to draw inferences related to underlying test 
content, even if the specific test items were not initially assessed.    
Although there is an extensive literature investigating the retesting effect on 
knowledge tests in education and cognitive psychology, some researchers (Carpenter, 
2012; Karpicke & Blunt, 2011; McDaniel et al., 2007) point out that the majority of 
research on the retesting effect focuses on relatively simple memory of novel material 
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(e.g., word lists, word pairs, short passages) that may or may not generalize to more 
complex knowledge.  Thus, this research has largely used relatively simple test content 
requiring the cued recall of target information from memory (Dunlosky et al., 2013), 
despite the clear value of more complex knowledge and its frequent use by personnel 
researchers (Dye et al., 1993; Raymond et al., 2007; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). 
Nevertheless, some research shows that more complex knowledge continues to 
exhibit retest increases in operational settings.  For instance, Geving et al. (2005) tracked 
the performance of over 9,000 repeat examinees on a state real estate licensure 
examination comprising multiple alternate forms drawn from an item pool where 
alternate forms contained 9% of their items in common.  While average retests scores 
increased by 0.62 standard deviations, there was no advantage to seeing the same items 
twice.  That is, test-takers improved their scores upon retest, but when responding to the 
same items on retest they were just as likely to change their responses from correct to 
incorrect as from incorrect to correct.  Similarly, Raymond et al. (2007) found no 
evidence of greater retest increases if test-takers received the same versus alternate 
forms for a radiography and computer tomography licensing exam.  Thus, it appears that 
the retesting effect results in comparable score gains across same and alternate test forms 
even for complex knowledge within operational settings. 
Consonant with the proposition that knowledge is more amenable to learning 
interventions than ability, comparing the magnitude of the retesting effect on alternate 
forms across construct domains permits an explication of whether memory or learning 
best accounts for the retesting effect.  That is, if memory best explains the retesting 
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effect, then test-takers who remember previous test-specific information are unlikely to 
differ on whether they remember knowledge or ability test information.  Furthermore, if 
memory best explains the retesting effect, then test-takers who complete an alternate 
form retest cannot exploit previous test-specific information, again, resulting in no 
difference in retest score gains between construct domains. Thus, if memory best 
accounts for the retesting effect, then: 
Hypothesis 3a: Retest score increases from initial test scores will be 
approximately equal for knowledge and ability; however, the magnitude of this 
retest increase will be larger on the same form retest compared to the alternate 
form retest (across construct domains). 
Again, based on the premise that knowledge is more amenable to learning than 
ability, if learning best explains the retesting effect, then test-takers are likely to show 
greater retest score gains for knowledge compared to ability.  Furthermore, if learning 
best explains the retesting effect, then test-takers who complete an alternate form retest 
should show retest score gains that are comparable in magnitude to test-takers who 
complete a same retest form.  Consequently, if learning best accounts for the retesting 
effect, then: 
Hypothesis 3b: Retest score increases from initial test scores will be higher for 






5.4 The Role of Additional Explanatory Variables for the Retesting Effect 
Whereas both primary research and meta-analyses have examined the magnitude 
and moderators of the retesting effect (Bangert-Drowns, Kulik, Kulik, & Morgan, 1991; 
Hausknecht et al., 2007), little research has examined the cognitive process underlying 
retesting in terms of GMA or working memory capacity (Dunlosky et al., 2013).  
Broadly, if learning underlies the retesting effect, then these score increases are likely to 
be influenced by GMA; whereas if memory underlies the retesting effect, then these 
score increases are likely to be influenced by working memory capacity. 
To fully understand the influence of these explanatory variables on retest score 
increases, alternate forms are necessary.  When alternate forms are used, test-takers 
cannot exploit previous test-specific information to improve their score without a 
concomitant increase in the underlying construct.  Therefore, alternate test forms 
attenuate the influence of test-takers’ working memory capacity to encode, recall, and 
consider previous test-specific content to improve their score.  However, if the retesting 
effect is influenced by learning, then individuals are not bound by test-specific 
information and should improve their score across operationalizations of the same 
construct.  That is, after controlling for the influence of memory by eliminating any test-
specific overlap between initial and retest administrations, test-takers may still learn the 
underlying construct and exhibit retest score gains.  Furthermore, if the retesting effect 
reflects memory, then test-taker’s working memory capacity is an individual difference 
that likely influences the magnitude of his/her retest score increases, but working 
memory capacity’s influence would be attenuated by alternate form retests.  Conversely, 
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if the retesting effect reflects learning, then test-takers’ GMA likely influences the 
magnitude of retest score increases, yet should generalize beyond same retest forms to 
alternate form retests.   
5.4.1 Working Memory Capacity and Memory Effects.  If memory explains 
the retest score increases, then working memory, the ability of test-takers to encode, 
manipulate, and recall information while simultaneously performing another cognitive 
task, is likely relevant.  Working memory capacity has been defined as “a brain system 
that provides temporary storage and manipulation of the information necessary for . . . 
complex cognitive tasks” (Baddeley, 1992, p. 556).  In the context of testing, test-takers 
use working memory capacity to solve cognitive problems by considering competing 
responses, drawing comparisons between alternatives, and then selecting their response 
by simultaneously matching the demands of the item, prior knowledge, and relevant 
information retrieved from memory (Hancock, Stock, & Kulhavy, 1992; Kulhavy & 
Stock, 1989; Webb, Stock, Kulhavy, Haygood, Zulu, & Robinson, 1990; Webb et al., 
1997).  
Working memory capacity is differentiated from short- and long-term memory as 
a general limitation on attentional capacity when maintaining multiple concepts in active 
memory while simultaneously performing distracting activities (Case, Kurland, & 
Goldberg, 1982; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Engle, 2002; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, 
& Conway, 1999).  That is, working memory capacity reflects limits of an individual’s 
ability to retrieve information from memory that has been lost from the focus of 
attention due to competing cognitive tasks (Baddeley, 1992; Case et al., 1982; Daneman 
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& Carpenter, 1980).  Accordingly, individuals with greater working memory capacity 
are more able to inhibit distractions across cognitive tasks (Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 
2001; Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Kane & Engle, 2003).   
The relationship between working memory capacity’s influence on ability and 
knowledge tests is due to an overlap in the underlying cognitive components of these 
tests.  Typical tests of working memory capacity comprise interleaving a set of 
information to be remembered with a secondary processing task (e.g., math operations, 
reading), requiring individuals to actively maintain to-be-remembered information 
through focused attention (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Turner & Engle, 1989).  
Similarly, the complexity of items on cognitively-loaded tests requires test-takers to use 
working memory capacity to maintain and retrieve multiple elements from items 
concurrently while solving the problem (Shelton, Elliott, Matthews, Hill, & Gouvier, 
2010).  Thus, working memory capacity may impact retest scores with similar working 
memory capacity task requirements, and yet not transfer across operationalizations and 
constructs to explain learning. 
5.4.2 GMA and Learning Effects.  If learning effects occur because initial 
testing facilitates the development of the underlying construct, then the underlying 
cognitive process that applies to other learning interventions should similarly apply to 
retesting.  Retest score increases are likely affected by the GMA of test-takers.  
Individuals higher in GMA benefit the most from learning interventions in general, as is 
reflected by the consistent relationship between GMA scores and training performance 
(Ackerman, 1987, 1988; Jensen, 1998; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) and is the direct 
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precursor to learning in applied settings (Schmidt et al., 1986).  The higher the cognitive 
complexity of a task, such as learning from a test rather than simply remembering 
previous responses, the higher the level of ability necessary to perform the task 
effectively (Gottfredson, 1997; Jensen, 1998).  Accordingly, it is commonly found that 
the higher the cognitive complexity of a test, the more difficult it becomes for test-takers 
to improve their scores through practice (Jensen, 1998; te Nijenhuis et al., 2001).  
Therefore, the differences in trainability between tests can be attributed to the 
differences between different tests’ g loading.   
The learning explanation would posit that individuals with greater ability would 
be better equipped to process, integrate, and utilize information from initial testing to 
improve their scores upon retest.  Therefore, if the retesting effect reflects learning, then 
GMA likely moderates this effect.  As the learning effects explanation would predict, 
GMA appears to moderate the magnitude of retest gains on both ability and knowledge 
tests; however, the evidence is sparse and mixed.  That is, individuals with greater ability 
also appear to gain more from initial testing and receive higher scores on retest than 
individuals with less ability.  For example, Kulik et al. (1984) found that GMA 
moderated the magnitude of mean score increases on second administrations of ability 
tests.  Using a sample of 3,605 sixth graders, Spitzer (1939) similarly found a larger 
retesting effect for higher-ability readers than for lower-ability readers on a text 
comprehension multiple-choice test.   
GMA also moderates the magnitude of the retesting effect on knowledge tests.  
Marsh, Agarwal, and Roediger (2009) reported a proportional relationship between 
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initial successful performance and the magnitude of the benefits accrued from retesting.  
That is, if test-takers perform poorly on initial tests, poor initial memory of test material 
may limit the benefits of testing due to a lack of elaborative, cognitive processing that 
usually occurs from successful retrieval (Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006).  Individuals who 
perform poorly on initial tests have gained less practice that might benefit learning, 
resulting in lower retest increases.  In fact, after controlling for GMA, Meyer and Logan 
(2013) found that the differences in the magnitude of the retesting effect between 
initially low and high performing test-takers disappeared. 
If the retesting effect is the result of memory and not learning, then GMA should 
display a comparatively weaker relationship with the magnitude of retest score increases.  
That is, retest increases that cannot be explained with GMA are unlikely to reflect 
learning.  Consistent with this prediction, Coyle (2006) found that retest increases on 
scholastic aptitude tests were unrelated to GMA.  Similarly, te Nijenhuis et al. (2001) 
found that retesting and coaching reduced the g-loadedness of ability test scores.  
Furthermore, te Nijenhuis et al. (2007) found that the lowest GMA test-takers actually 
exhibited the largest retest score gains after an intervention designed to develop the 
ability.  As individuals greater in ability are consistently more likely to improve in 
training situations (Ackerman, 1987, 1988; Jensen, 1998; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; 
Schmidt et al., 1986), these findings instead suggest that the retesting effect is not due to 
initial levels of GMA, but rather may include more narrow abilities such as memory 
(Jensen, 1998; Lievens et al., 2007; te Nijenhuis et al., 2007).  
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As such, test-takers who remember previous test-specific information (Kulik et 
al., 1984) through working memory capacity are able to meet the cognitive demands of 
the retest while simultaneously recalling, processing, and considering previous items, 
strategies, and responses from the initial test.  However, working memory capacity 
cannot aid test-takers in improving their retest scores on alternate form retests as there is 
no test-specific overlap.  Thus, if memory effects best account for the retesting effect, 
then working memory capacity is likely the ability that allows test-takers to improve 
their retest scores irrespective of the underlying construct assessed.  However, test-takers 
with higher GMA are no more likely to remember previous test experiences than test-
takers with lower GMA.   
Given that GMA is the “ability to learn”, an additional and separate GMA test is 
necessary to investigate the extent to which GMA might explain learning due to retesting 
on both the knowledge and another ability test.  Specifically, the present study uses 
Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices (APM, Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990; Raven, 
1989; Raven, Court, & Raven, 1985; Raven, Raven, & Court, 1994) to explain retest 
score gains, as it was originally constructed as an operationalization of Spearman’s g 
(Spearman & Jones, 1950) and has been found to have the highest g loading across a 
variety of GMA tests (te Nijenhuis et al., 2001).  Thus, it is likely that this test would be 
most resistant to the training of, and transfer from the other ability tests in the present 
study (te Nijenhuis et al., 2001; te Nijenhuis et al., 2007), and therefore may be used to 
explain the retest score increases as reflecting learning on the retest measures.  Thus, if 
memory best accounts for the retesting effect, then it is expected that:  
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Hypothesis 4a: The relationship between working memory capacity and retest 
score increases will be stronger than the relationship between GMA and retest 
scores increases and be of greater magnitude for the same form retest than the 
alternate form retests.   
On the other hand, if learning best accounts for the retest score increases, then 
test-takers with higher GMA are more likely to experience greater learning from initial 
testing and therefore greater development of the underlying construct.  Test-takers with 
greater working memory capacity, however, are unable to use their memory of test-
specific information to improve their score on alternate form retests.  Thus, under a 
learning explanation for the retesting effect, it is expected that:  
Hypothesis 4b: The relationship between GMA and retest score increases will be 
stronger than the relationship between working memory capacity and retest 
scores increases and be of a similar magnitude between the same form retest and 
the alternate form retest.   
5.5 Examining the Retesting Effect using Corrective Feedback 
Historically, providing corrective feedback has long been investigated and used 
to improve learning (Pressey, 1926; Thorndike, 1913; Trowbridge & Carson, 1932).  
Common theory on the positive effect of corrective feedback on performance is largely 
derived from the behaviorist law of effect (Thorndike, 1913), but the influence of 
corrective feedback is more complex (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996).  Given the inconsistent 
benefit of providing corrective feedback for test performance, this review of the 
feedback literature focuses on the value of corrective feedback as a moderator of 
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learning interventions in general (Kluger & DeNisi, 1996) and the retesting effect 
specifically (Butler, Karpicke, & Roediger, 2007, 2008; Butler & Roediger, 2007). 
Individuals use feedback (whether actively provided by an intervention or not) to 
evaluate their performance relative to their goals and focus attention on specific targets 
to achieve those goals (Kluger & Denisi, 1996).  Specific to retesting, corrective 
feedback draws attention to the test-taker to learn task rules and recognize errors (e.g., 
Frese & Zapf, 1994).  Kulhavy (1977) proposed that the primary benefit of corrective 
feedback for testing lies in decreasing response competition between incorrect and 
correct responses, thus guiding the test-taker to correct errors.  However, corrective 
feedback after even initially correct responses also appears important to learning, as 
feedback allows individuals to confirm the accuracy of correct guesses that may not be 
maintained otherwise (Butler et al., 2007; 2008).  
Across diverse tasks, Kluger and Denisi’s (1996) meta-analysis demonstrated 
that corrective feedback generated greater performance increases when interventions 
provide cues that directly support learning and goal setting compared to feedback that 
provides cues directing attention towards the self (i.e., were not directly related to task 
performance and learning).  The benefit of retesting with corrective feedback is that it 
consistently outperforms retesting without corrective feedback (Dunlosky et al., 2013).  
Not surprisingly, more extensive feedback interventions show greater score increases on 
ability tests compared to retesting alone (d = 0.51 and 0.25, respectively, Kulik et al., 
1984).  Despite the evidence that the retesting effect demonstrates score increases greater 
than common learning techniques, including additional studying, concept mapping, note-
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taking, and imagery use (Fritz, Morris, Acton, Voelkel, & Etkind, 2007; Karpicke & 
Blunt, 2011; McDaniel et al., 2009; Neuschatz, Preston, Toglia, & Neuschatz, 2005), the 
magnitude of these retest increases is moderated by the extent to which initial testing 
was accompanied with corrective feedback.  Specifically, Kulik et al. (1984) 
differentiate between the magnitude of retesting increases based on the degree to which 
an external intervention actively encourages learning rather than merely providing 
performance assessment (i.e., corrective feedback as to why a response is correct or 
incorrect rather than simply identifying responses as correct or incorrect).  Furthermore, 
the learning benefits of corrective feedback are also moderated by initial test 
performance, in that corrective feedback provides greater score increases to test-takers 
who performed better on an initial test (Kang, McDermott, & Roediger, 2007). 
Although corrective feedback may provide test-takers an additional means for 
facilitating learning from initial testing, test-takers may also use corrective feedback as a 
crutch with no concomitant learning (Anderson, 1987), and subsequently, reduce the 
likelihood that learning will transfer across operationalizations of the construct.  In 
accordance with this proposition, corrective feedback was found to be detrimental to the 
performance of tasks that were somewhat different than the task on which corrective 
feedback was initially provided (Carroll & Kay, 1988).  Furthermore, corrective 
feedback may improve test scores but this benefit may not generalize to alternate forms 
or external criteria.  Some interventions, such as practice or coaching, may significantly 
increase ability scores (Hausknecht et al 2007); yet these gains are not always 
generalizable across tests (e.g., te Nijenhui et al., 2007).  Indeed, even learning 
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interventions specifically aimed at increasing GMA do not generalize to alternate test 
forms assessing the same construct or the external criteria that GMA commonly predicts 
(Skuy et al., 2002).  Thus, it appears possible that corrective feedback exacerbates 
memory effects on same retest forms and interferes with more elaborate learning that 
might transfer across alternate form retests (Kluger & Denisi, 1996).  To investigate the 
competing learning and memory effects explanation for the retesting effect with 
corrective feedback, the use of alternate test forms are necessary.   
Little research has directly examined the effect of corrective feedback on 
alternate test forms; however, there is substantial evidence that corrective feedback 
moderates the retesting effect across alternate response formats (e.g., initial multiple-
choice testing followed by short answer response formats, Kang et al. 2007).  If testing 
does in fact function as a learning intervention, providing test-takers with corrective 
feedback should intensify the retesting effect by further facilitating the learning value of 
initial testing.  That is, corrective feedback from initial test performance has the potential 
to promote more elaborate understanding, conceptualization, and consolidation of the 
underlying construct domain.  Accordingly, previous research demonstrates that 
corrective feedback provides cues that support and encourage goal setting, error 
correction, and learning from initial testing (Butler et al., 2007; 2008; Frese & Zapf, 
1994; Kluger & Denisi, 1996; Kulik et al., 1984).  If corrective feedback intensifies the 
retesting effect to develop a test-taker’s underlying construct through learning, then any 
subsequent operationalization assessing that construct should reveal this increase.   
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As reviewed previously, corrective feedback provides test-takers with 
performance information that may be used to facilitate learning from the initial test, 
however, it will also provide test-takers the opportunity remember test-specific 
information.  Thus, corrective feedback offers a means of investigating the cognitive 
process—memory or learning—that underlie the retesting effect, but is limited by the 
extent to which the same test form is used.  Therefore, the use of alternate forms 
eliminates the test-takers’ ability to use the memory of previous test-specific information 
that corrective feedback may provide.  Thus, if memory best accounts for the retesting 
effect, then: 
Hypothesis 5a: Retest score increases will be higher for the corrective feedback 
condition compared to the no corrective feedback condition; however, the 
magnitude of this effect will be larger on the same form retest than the alternate 
form retest. 
On the other hand, if learning best explains the retesting effect, then test-takers 
receiving corrective feedback followed by the alternate form retest should show 
comparable retesting increases to test-takers who received the same retest form.  Thus, if 
learning best accounts for the retesting effect, then: 
Hypothesis 5b: Retest score increases will be higher for the corrective feedback 
condition compared to the no corrective feedback condition and the magnitude of 
this effect will be similar for both the same form retest and alternate form retest.   
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The preceding conceptual arguments and expected pattern of results engender 
analogous hypotheses in reference to response time such that if memory best accounts 
for the retesting effect, then it is expected that:  
Hypothesis 6a: Retest response times will be faster than initial test response 
times for the corrective feedback condition compared to the no corrective 
feedback condition.  However, the magnitude of the difference between the 
initial and retest response times will be larger on the same form retest than the 
alternate form retest. 
On the other hand, if learning best accounts for the retesting effect, then:   
Hypothesis 6b: Retest response times will be faster than initial test response 
times for the corrective feedback condition compared to the no corrective 
feedback condition and the magnitude of this effect will be similar for both the 
same form retest and alternate form retest. 
5.5.1 Corrective Feedback by Construct Domain.  Corrective feedback 
facilitates score improvements across both ability and knowledge assessments.  
Corrective feedback exhibits a significant, but small effect on knowledge testing (d = 
0.26, Bangert-Drowns et al., 1991), and when corrective feedback is provided, these 
retest gains are greater than common learning interventions (Dunlosky et al., 2013; Kang 
et al., 2007).  Learning increases following corrective feedback are not confined to 
knowledge tests, as meta-analytic evidence indicates that learning interventions (such as 
coaching) on ability tests can positively impact ability test scores upon retest at a 
magnitude greater than simply retesting alone (d = 0.70 versus 0.24, respectively; 
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Hausknecht et al., 2007).  Specifically, providing corrective feedback after test-takers 
responded to each item improved tests of verbal (Betz & Weiss, 1976a, 1976b) and 
vocabulary ability at a greater rate than non-feedback conditions (Prestwood, 1979).  
Although no studies have directly compared the magnitude of the retesting effect with 
corrective feedback for both knowledge and ability, because knowledge is more 
amenable to intervention than ability, one would therefore expect that corrective 
feedback after initial testing to be a more robust intervention for knowledge than ability.  
Conversely, if the retesting effect is primarily influenced by the memory of previous 
test-specific information, then one would not expect differential memory effects for 
knowledge versus ability tests.  Thus, if memory best accounts for the retesting effect, 
then: 
Hypothesis 7a: Retest score increases will be approximately equal for ability and 
knowledge, but exhibit an interactive effect between receiving corrective 
feedback conditions and retest form, such that receiving corrective feedback will 
increase retest scores at a greater magnitude for the same form retest than the 
alternate form retest.   
However, if learning best accounts for the retesting effect, then: 
Hypothesis 7b:  Retest score increases will be higher for knowledge than ability 
and exhibit an interactive effect with corrective feedback condition, such that 
receiving corrective feedback will increase retest scores at a greater magnitude 
for knowledge than ability, but the magnitude of this effect will be similar for the 
same form retest and alternate form retest.   
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5.5.2 Corrective Feedback for Memory Effects: The Role of Working 
Memory Capacity.  Corrective feedback prior to retesting may facilitate learning, but 
may also provide test-takers with test-specific information and strategies that may be 
remembered and repeated to improve test scores despite no concomitant increase in the 
underlying construct (Powers, 1986).  As would be predicted by memory, the retesting 
effect occurs even in the absence of corrective feedback (Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a).  
In fact, corrective feedback shows greater benefits for simple-task performance (e.g., 
memory) compared to more complex-task performance (e.g., learning; Kluger & Denisi, 
1996).  Thus, corrective feedback may actually exacerbate memory effects rather than 
facilitate learning.   
Corrective feedback is not universally beneficial.  Corrective feedback may 
promote learning if test-takers are receptive; however, corrective feedback may actually 
inhibit learning if test-takers do not actively consider or use the feedback to develop a 
greater understanding of the construct domain (Saloman & Globerson, 1987).  Instead of 
promoting learning, corrective feedback may act as a crutch that reduces the need to 
learn to perform the task better (Anderson, 1987).  For example, in situations where test-
takers may simply copy correct responses without making any attempt at cognitive 
elaboration or integration with their previously developed knowledge, corrective 
feedback actually hinders learning (Anderson, Kulhavy, & Andre, 1971, 1972).  
Irrespective of the potential learning influence of testing, corrective feedback also 
provides test-takers with test-specific information that promotes memory effects, which 
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are likely to be retained and exploited using working memory capacity, rather than 
learned using GMA.   
5.5.3 Corrective Feedback for Learning Effects: The Role of GMA.  If 
learning underlies the retesting effect, then test-takers provided with specific and 
accurate performance information after an initial test will likely experience greater 
learning on the underlying construct and will therefore score higher upon retest than test-
takers not provided with corrective feedback.  Despite the differences in magnitude in 
the retesting effect with and without corrective feedback, it is not clear whether this 
reflects learning, rather than merely providing additional test-specific information and 
leading to memory effects.  Test-takers’ behaviors lends some insight into whether 
learning actually occurs.   
When individuals receive corrective feedback, the rate of error correction appears 
proportional to one’s confidence in the initial error (Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; Stock et 
al., 1992).  Previous research has shown that the retesting effect without corrective 
feedback is lower, as incorrectly selecting non-keyed responses on an initial test may 
cause test-takers to retain non-keyed responses as correct on a retest rather than recall 
that they did not know the answer and try again (Butler & Roediger, 2008).  Yet this 
incorrect guessing does not impair the learning of the correct response, as long as 
corrective feedback is provided after these errors (Butler & Roediger, 2008; Kang et al., 
2011).  In fact, corrective feedback sometimes reduces the test-takers’ retrieval of 
previous responses that were incorrect, even when test-takers are specifically instructed 
to remember their original (incorrect) responses (Webb et al., 1997).   
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The efficacy of corrective feedback in facilitating the learning of the underlying 
test content is largely determined by whether the corrective feedback includes the correct 
response (for meta-analyses, see Bangert-Drowns et al., 1991; Kluger & DeNisi, 1996).  
For example, corrective feedback that simply indicates that a response is right or wrong 
is less effective than the presentation of the correct response itself (e.g., Pashler, Cepeda, 
Wixted, & Rohrer, 2005).  Accordingly, corrective feedback is primarily beneficial 
through error correction and prompting individuals to meta-cognitively re-evaluate their 
responses, not merely providing additional opportunities to remember previous 
responses (Bangert-Drowns et al., 1991).  Test-takers are likely to exert greater effort to 
understand the tested content when corrective feedback is provided, as responses with 
greater discrepancy will promote greater error correction on subsequent tests (Kulhavy 
& Stock, 1989; Stock et al., 1992; Webb et al., 1994).  Corrective feedback is 
particularly effective in protecting against these high-confidence and perseveration 
errors (i.e., when test-takers consistently respond incorrectly to the same items) to a 
greater effect than retesting alone (Butler & Roediger, 2008; Butterfield & Metcalfe, 
2001).  Test-takers with greater GMA are more able to reconcile this discrepancy and 
correct their responses on retest. 
Nevertheless, learning can still take place without corrective feedback if test-
takers self-assess (Meichenbaum, 1985; Wong, 1985).  Without corrective feedback on 
test performance, test-takers who experience difficulty in responding to certain test items 
may subsequently identify content that requires further study or thought (Roediger & 
Karpicke, 2006a).  Thus, corrective feedback is not necessary for the retesting effect to 
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reflect learning.  In any case, the potential value of corrective feedback to facilitate 
testing as a learning intervention invariably provides test-takers the cues to recall 
previous test-specific responses and is best investigated in conjunction with alternating 
retest forms.  The magnitude of retest score increases by corrective feedback condition 
are likely to be differentially influenced by GMA and working memory capacity 
depending on whether the retesting effect is best explained by learning or memory 
effects.  Thus, if memory best accounts for the retesting effect, then: 
Hypothesis 8a: A stronger relationship will exist between working memory 
capacity and retest score increases compared to GMA and retest score increases 
for the corrective feedback condition compared to the no corrective feedback 
condition, and the magnitude of this relationship will be larger on the same form 
retest than the alternate form retest. 
However, if learning best accounts for the retesting effect, then: 
Hypothesis 8b: A stronger relationship will exist between GMA and retest score 
increases compared to working memory capacity and retest score increases for 
the corrective feedback condition compared to the no corrective feedback 
condition, and the magnitude of this relationship will be similar for both the same 
form retest and alternate form retest.   
5.6 Controlling for the Influence of Test Attitudes on the Retesting Effect 
Although most external influences on retest performance are unsystematic and 
comprise the random error present with all testing (e.g., test-taker mood, illness, 
distraction, nuances in test administration), fluctuations in error variance that 
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systematically covary with testing administrations present plausible alternate 
explanations for the retesting effect (Anastasi, 1981; Messick, 1989).  Accordingly, 
researchers have often explained retest increases by citing a decrease in debilitating test 
attitudes (e.g., test anxiety; Cassady & Johnson, 2002; Hausknecht, Day, & Thomas, 
2004; McCarthy & Goffin, 2005) or, relatedly, increases in facilitating test attitudes 
(e.g., test motivation, test familiarity; Chan, Schmitt, DeShon, Clause, & Delbridge, 
1997; Lievens et al., 2005; Reeve & Lam, 2007).  Thus, test attitudes are a source of 
error variance that suppress initial test scores, but exert less influence at retest, and 
therefore, increase retest scores and subsequently enhance validity as the error variance 
is removed.   
A substantial body of literature exists investigating the influence of test-taker 
attitudes on initial test scores, thus it is not unreasonable to posit that test attitudes 
systematically vary upon retest and similarly affect retest performance (Reeve & Lam, 
2007).  Van Iddekinge et al. (2011) present evidence that test attitudes covarying with 
retesting would not only increase test scores but affect validity coefficients as well.  
Various test attitudes may affect test (and retest) performance, the present discussion is 
limited to the two test attitudes most likely to covary with retesting, reduced test anxiety 
(Cassady & Johnson, 2002; Messick & Jungeblut, 1981) and increased test motivation 
(Hausknecht et al., 2002).  Although, it is certainly plausible that test attitudes 
systematically covary with retesting, few, if any, studies have directly examined the 
fluctuation of test-takers’ attitudes at both initial and retest performance (Schleicher et 
al., 2006) nor how test-taker attitudes directly interact with the retesting effect to 
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influence test score’ validity (Lievens et al., 2007).  Thus, to explicate whether the 
retesting effect reflects either learning or memory requires controlling for the potential 
confounding influence of test attitudes (Reeve, Heggestad, & Lievens, 2008).  
5.7 Summary 
The prevalence and influence of the retesting effect on the scientific community 
and society at large underscore the importance of understanding whether these retest 
increases reflect either memory effects or learning.  It is clear that the retesting effect 
consistently influences the tests that organizations, educators, and policy-makers use to 
make decisions across work, educational, and social settings.  Despite the divergent 
implications that a learning versus memory explanation of the retesting effect has for 
retesting policies and practices in both academic and applied domains, a lack of 
integrated research between cognitive, education, and personnel researchers limits 
advancements in this domain and the subsequent inability to make clear evidence-based 
recommendations.  Consequently, examining whether learning or memory best accounts 
for the retesting effect is the major contribution of the present study to literatures in 
psychology, education, and management and its findings potentially have implications 
for test developers, test users, test-takers, policy makers, and society at large.  A 
summary of the competing hypotheses for the posited memory and learning explanations 






List of Competing Hypotheses 
 
Hypotheses If memory best explains the retesting effect:  If learning best explains the retesting effect: 
1 (a) Retest scores will be higher than initial 
scores; however, the magnitude of this 
effect will be larger on the same form retest 
than the alternate form retest. 
(b) Retest scores will be higher than initial 
test scores and the magnitude of this effect 
will be similar for both the same and 
alternate form retests.   
   
2 (a) Retest response times will be faster than 
initial test response times. However, the 
magnitude of the difference between the 
initial and retest response times will be 
larger on the same form retest than the 
alternate form retest. 
(b) Retest response times will be faster than 
initial test response times.  However, the 
magnitude of the difference between the 
initial and retest response time for the same 
and alternate form retest will be small (i.e., 
similar). 
   
3 (a) Retest score increases from initial test 
scores will be approximately equal for 
knowledge and ability; however, the 
magnitude of this retest increase will be 
larger on the same form retest compared to 
the alternate form retest (across construct 
domains). 
(b) Retest score increases from initial test 
scores will be higher for knowledge than 
ability, irrespective of whether the same or 
alternate form retest is administered. 
   
4 (a) The relationship between working 
memory capacity and retest score increases 
will be stronger than the relationship 
between GMA and retest scores increases 
and be of greater magnitude for the same 
form retest than the alternate form retests.   
(b) The relationship between GMA and 
retest score increases will be stronger than 
the relationship between working memory 
capacity and retest scores increases and be 
of a similar magnitude between the same 
form retest and the alternate form retest.   
   
5 (a) Retest score increases will be higher for 
the corrective feedback condition compared 
to the no corrective feedback condition; 
however, the magnitude of this effect will 
be larger on the same form retest than the 
alternate form retest. 
(b) Retest score increases will be higher for 
the corrective feedback condition compared 
to the no corrective feedback condition and 
the magnitude of this effect will be similar 
for both the same form retest and alternate 
form retest. 






List of Competing Hypotheses (Continued) 
 
Hypotheses If memory best explains the retesting effect: If learning best explains the retesting effect:  
   
6 (a) Retest response times will be faster than 
initial test response times for the corrective 
feedback condition compared to the no 
corrective feedback condition.  However, 
the magnitude of the difference between the 
initial and retest response times will be 
larger on the same form retest than the 
alternate form retest. 
(b) Retest response times will be faster than 
initial test response times for the corrective 
feedback condition compared to the no 
corrective feedback condition and the 
magnitude of this effect will be similar for 
both the same form retest and alternate form 
retest. 
   
7 (a) Retest score increases will be 
approximately equal for ability and 
knowledge, but exhibit an interactive effect 
between receiving corrective feedback 
conditions and retest form, such that 
receiving corrective feedback will increase 
retest scores at a greater magnitude for the 
same form retest than the alternate form 
retest.   
(b) Retest score increases will be higher for 
knowledge than ability and exhibit an 
interactive effect with corrective feedback 
condition, such that receiving corrective 
feedback will increase retest scores at a 
greater magnitude for knowledge than 
ability, but the magnitude of this effect will 
be similar for the same form retest and 
alternate form retest.   
   
8 (a) A stronger relationship will exist 
between working memory capacity and 
retest score increases compared to GMA 
and retest score increases for the corrective 
feedback condition compared to the no 
corrective feedback condition, and the 
magnitude of this relationship will be larger 
on the same form retest than the alternate 
form retest. 
(b) A stronger relationship will exist 
between GMA and retest score increases 
compared to working memory capacity and 
retest score increases for the corrective 
feedback condition compared to the no 
corrective feedback condition, and the 
magnitude of this relationship will be 
similar for both the same form retest and 






Participants comprised 374 individuals recruited from Texas A&M University 
who had completed an introductory psychology class.  The sample was restricted to 
individuals who had completed an undergraduate introduction to psychology course 
because the knowledge test that was used in the study (i.e., the General Psychology 
Competency Exam; Arthur, Tubré, Paul, & Edens, 2003) is a walking-knowledge, basic 
psychology competency exam.   
Participants were recruited using a number of different methods.  Primarily, 
participants were recruited using academic advising listservs of departments where 
introductory to psychology courses were common or required (e.g., Psychology, Health 
and Kinesiology, Industrial Distribution).  Additionally, participants were recruited 
through flyers, recruiting visits to upper-level psychology courses, and social media 
websites (e.g., Facebook).  Participants recruited from the preceding sources were paid 
$20 for their participation. 
Finally, participants were also recruited from the present university’s Psychology 
Department subject pool.  Consequently, these particular participants completed this 
study in return for partial course credit, rather than compensation.  These participants 
were only eligible to participate if they had already completed their introductory 
psychology course, but had not yet completed their required subject pool credit hours. 
In addition to the $20 participation compensation or subject pool credit, 
performance incentives were used to address the population and ecological validity 
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concerns associated with using a low-stakes student sample.  Consequently, participants 
performing in the top 10% of the sample were awarded a $50 performance reward based 
on the mean of all their knowledge and ability test scores (i.e., Time 1 and Time 2).  
Participants were informed of the compensation and performance rewards at recruitment, 
and the beginning of Time 1 and Time 2 sessions.  
6.2 Research Design 
The study was a 2 (retest form; same form versus alternate form) × 2 (corrective 
feedback versus no feedback) repeated measures, mixed factorial, experimental design in 
which participants were tested on two separate occasions separated by a 7-10 day retest 
interval.  That is, test format and corrective feedback were both manipulated as between-
subjects conditions.  Consequently, participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
four conditions, and commenced the study protocol by first completing the ability and 
knowledge tests.  They then received item-level corrective feedback or not, and then 
were retested 7-10 days later on either the same or an alternate form of the ability and 
knowledge tests.  Test type (ability versus knowledge) was a within-subjects variable in 
that all participants were administered both ability and knowledge tests at Time 1 and 





Research Design and Measures 
Time 1  Time 2 
Measures 
Working Memory Capacity 
General Mental Ability 
Test Anxiety 
Test-Taking Motivation 
Knowledge Test Form A or B 

























Test-Taking Motivation   
Knowledge Test Form A or B 
Ability Test Form A or B 
 
 
6.3 Power Analysis to Detect Hypothesized Effects 
To estimate the number of participants necessary to detect the anticipated effects 
posited in the hypotheses, an a priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3.1 
(Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchnar, & Lang, 2009).  This 
power analysis was based on the most conservative hypothesis in the study.  
Consequently, if the study has sufficient power to detect this specified effect, then it 
would by inference have sufficient power to detect the less conservative effects as well. 
The hypothesis that served as the basis for the power analysis pertains to a one-
tailed test of the difference between two independent correlations (i.e., a q effect size).  
Specifically, this hypothesis consisted of the comparison of the effect size based on the 
extant meta-analytic literature of corrective feedback on knowledge retest score 
increases (d = .30, Bangert-Drowns et al., 1991) to the effect size of corrective feedback 
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on ability retest score increases (d = .11, Hausknecht et al., 2007; difference between 
these effect sizes, q = .20).  These parameter estimates served as the basis the effect 
sizes used for the power analysis, and alpha was set to .05 and power for .80.  Table 3 
presents these a priori parameters which estimated that the optimal sample size to detect 
the difference between these effects was 638 participants.   
On completing the study, a post-hoc power analysis was also computed using the 
present study’s effect sizes and N, which indicated a power level of .12.  Implications of 
the differences between the a priori and post hoc power analyses are discussed in the 






Power Analysis for Detecting a One-Tailed Difference between Two Independent Correlations 
 
Parameters Power Analysis Parameters Theoretical Basis 
Present Study’s  
Parameters 
Corrective feedback effect 
size on retest ability 
performance 
.11 (0.22) 
Hausknecht et al.’s (2007) meta-analysis found 
a corrected retest increase of .22 standard 
deviations retesting score increase after test 
coaching following the initial general mental 
ability test. 
.15 (.31) 
Corrective feedback effect 
size on  retest knowledge 
performance 
.30 (0.63) 
Bangert-Drowns et al.’s (1991) meta-analysis 
found a corrected retest increase of .63 standard 
deviations retesting score increase after test 
feedback following the initial knowledge test.  
.20 (.41) 
q effect size difference 
estimate .20  .05 
α Level .05  .05 
Power level  .80  .12 (actual power level). 
Between-subjects sample 
(Alternate Test Form A) 
319 participants 
required  171 participants
Between-subjects sample 
(Alternate Test Form B) 
319 participants 
required  169 participants
Total Sample 638 participants required
 340 participants
Note. d values are reported in parentheses and these were converted into r effect size estimates and q effect size differences 




With exception of the Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices, all measures were 
computer-administered via Inquisit. 
6.4.1 Knowledge Test.  The General Psychology Competency Examination 
(GPCE) 2.1 is a 40-item, three-alternative, content-valid, multiple-choice, walking-
knowledge psychology competency exam that assesses mastery of basic concepts, 
principles, and facts covered in the standard introductory psychology course.  This 
current measure is an updated, revised, and revalidated (content-related) version of the 
exam that was initially developed by and used in Arthur et al. (2003), Fehrmann, Woehr, 
and Arthur (1991), and Woehr, Arthur, and Fehrmann (1991).  Sample items are 
reported in Appendix A.  The procedures that were undertaken in the revision and 
revalidation effort are presented in Appendix B.   
Two alternate forms of the GPCE 2.1, each consisting of 40 items were used and 
participants’ scores were the summed number of items answered correctly.  Woehr et al. 
(1991) reported an internal consistency reliability estimate of .51 for the previous GPCE 
(1.0) scores.  Test-retest reliabilities for the knowledge test forms are reported in Table 
4.  
6.4.2 General Mental Ability (GMA).  Two GMA tests were used.  One GMA 
test was used as the comparative ability test to the knowledge test.  This GMA test is a 
speeded 4-alternative, multiple-choice, 60-item (30 verbal and 30 numeric) test similar 
to that was developed by Arthur (2004; 2005).  Participants were allotted 10 minutes to 
complete the test.  Participants’ test scores were calculated as the total number of items 
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answered correctly.  Two alternate forms of this test were used, each consisting of 60 
items.  Arthur, Glaze, Villado, and Taylor (2010) reported a retest reliability coefficient 
of .78 (mean retest interval = 429.16 days, SD = 54.84) for an equivalent form of this 
test, along with a convergent validity of .72 with the Thurstone Test of Mental Alertness.  
Test-retest reliabilities across ability test forms are reported in Table 4 below.    
GMA was also measured using the short form of the Raven’s Advanced 
Progressive Matrices (APM; Arthur & Day, 1994; Arthur, Tubré, Paul, & Sanchez-Ku, 
1999) which consists of 2 practice and 12 test items.  Participants were allotted 15 
minutes to complete the test.  Participants’ scores were the total number of items 
answered correctly.  Arthur et al. (1999) reported a 1-week test-retest reliability of .76.  
This assessment was used to investigate the relationships between GMA and retest gains 
on both the knowledge and ability tests, primarily as evidence of learning. 
6.4.3 Alternate Forms.  Alternate forms exist along a continuum.  In the present 
study, alternate forms for both the knowledge and ability tests are conceptualized as 
reflecting the same item format and the underlying content at the item-level and are 
operationalized as such.  For example, the first item for both Knowledge Test A and B 
requires knowledge of social psychology, whereas the first item for both Ability Test A 
and B requires division.  For the knowledge test forms, the content and item order were 
based on the initial GPCE 1.0 and assessments by relevant subject matter experts (see 
Appendix B).  For the ability tests, the content and order of the items mirrored the 
original test (Arthur, 2004, 2005).    
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Assessments of the reliability of alternate forms are inevitably conservative 
estimates, as the magnitude of the relationship between the tests exists across 
operationalizations (reflecting the degree of equivalency of the alternate forms) as well 
as time (reflecting temporal stability).  This is visible in the magnitude of consistency 
between alternate form’s reliability versus same form reliability over time.  All things 
being equal for the same time interval, different test forms should exhibit lower than 
same form retest reliability.  As seen in Table 4, these alternate forms do not exhibit a 
perfect correlation (indicating perfectly similarity), but are of a sufficiently high enough 












 Form A Form B 
Form A 
.76 
Same Form  
(AA, N = 82) 
.75 
Alternate Form  
(BA, N = 82) 
Form B 
.71 
Alternate Form  
(AB, N = 89) 
.60 
Same Form  
(BB, N = 87) 





 Form A Form B 
Form A 
.76 
Same Form  
(AA, N = 82) 
.58 
Alternate Form  
(BA, N = 82) 
Form B 
.64  
Alternate Form  
(AB, N = 89) 
.70 
Same Form  
(BB, N = 87) 
Note. Total N = 340. See Appendix E for retest interval descriptive statistics by form and 
corrective feedback manipulations.   
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6.4.4 Working Memory Capacity.  A computerized version of the N-back lag 
task was used to assess participants’ working memory capacity (Shelton, Metzger, & 
Elliott, 2007).  The N-back lag task consists of a list of items presented at a rate of one 
item (a letter) per second.  At the end of each list, participants are asked to recall the last 
item in the list—the one presented 1-back, 2-back, or 3-back in the list—to 
operationalize working memory capacity function.  Participants’ scores are the average 
number of items correctly recalled in the list minus incorrect recalls (i.e., misses).   
Like the Raven’s APM, the inclusion of this measure permits an investigation of 
the relationships between working memory capacity and retest scores on both the 
knowledge and GMA tests.  No test-retest reliability data are reported in the extant 
literature for Shelton et al.’s (2007) N-back lag task; however, in a convergent validation 
study, Geffen (2004) reported an average correlation of .51 between the subscales (0-, 1-
, 2-, or 3-back trials) of the N-back lag task, reflecting some degree of internal 
consistency between the trials. 
6.4.5 Test-taking motivation.  Test-taking motivation was measured using eight 
items adopted from the Test Attitude Survey (Arvey, Strickland, Drauden, & Martin, 
1990).  Examples of items are “Doing well on this test is important to me” and “I will try 
my best on this test.”  Ratings were made on a 5-point Likert scale (1 - strongly disagree; 
5 - strongly agree).  Arvey et al. (1990) reported an internal consistency reliability 
estimate of .85 for the test-taking motivation scores.  The measure was scored by 
obtaining the mean of the eight items (T1 α = .72 and T2 α = .74, test-retest reliability 
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coefficient = .65).  Test-taking motivation was included in the study as a potential 
control variable.  
6.4.6 Test anxiety.  Test anxiety was measured using 10 items adopted from the 
Test Attitude Survey (Arvey et al., 1990).  Examples of items are “I usually get very 
anxious about taking tests.” and “During a test, I get so nervous I can't do as well as I 
should have.”  Ratings were made on a 5-point Likert scale (1 - strongly disagree; 5 - 
strongly agree).  Arvey et al. (1990) report an internal consistency reliability estimate of 
.80 for the test-taking motivation scores.  The measure was scored by obtaining the mean 
of the 10 items (T1 α = .64 and T2 α = .66, test-retest reliability coefficient = .82).  Like 
test-taking motivation, test anxiety was included as a potential control variable. 
6.4.7 Retest Interval Behavioral Inventory.  A number of possible participants’ 
behaviors between the initial and retest measures could serve as a potential confound to 
the study’s results (i.e., seeking test answers in some way between initial test and retest).  
Consequently, self-reports of how participants spent their time between the initial test 
and retest sessions were also collected.  The full measure can be found in Appendix A.   
6.5 Procedure 
Depending on the number of participants who were scheduled for and actually 
attended a session, participants were run in groups of up to 8 individuals with each 
participant at their own computer workstation.  In terms of the details of the protocol, at 
Time 1, participants first read and signed the informed consent declaration, which 
explained the purpose and instructions for the study.  Participants then completed the 
individual difference measures, which consisted of the working memory capacity 
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measure and the paper-and-pencil Raven’s APM.  Prior to completing the Raven’s APM 
and initial test measures, participants then completed the test anxiety and test-taking 
motivation measures.  Participants next went on to complete the initial knowledge (i.e., 
GPCE version 2.1) and ability tests.  The order of the knowledge and ability tests was 
counterbalanced across conditions (test forms; corrective feedback versus no feedback 
condition).   
Participants were randomly assigned to the between-subjects corrective feedback 
manipulation (i.e., either receiving corrective feedback or no feedback) prior to 
beginning the study.  So, following the completion of the initial tests, participants in the 
corrective feedback condition received their total test performance as well as item-level 
corrective feedback for both the knowledge and ability tests.  Corrective feedback was 
administered via Inquisit.  Each item was presented on the computer screen individually, 
along with the participant’s response and the keyed response.  Participants could spend a 
maximum of thirty seconds reviewing each item or choose to advance to the next item at 
their own pace.  Corrective feedback was only provided for the items that participants 
responded to.  Participants could not take feedback with them.  In contrast, participants 
in the control condition received no feedback at either the item- or test-level.  Upon 
completion of the tests and/or feedback session, participants were thanked for their 
participation and scheduled to return for Time 2. 
Research has consistently demonstrated that the length of the retest or retention 
interval is an important moderator of the retesting effect (Hausknecht et al. 2007; 
Roediger & Karpicke, 2006b).  Thus, the choice of the length of the retest interval was 
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not trivial.  Hausknecht et al.’s (2007) meta-analytic mean retest interval was 134.52 
days (SD = 304.67 days), with a median of 20 days.  Considering this extreme variability 
of retest intervals in the extant literature and the study’s goal of investigating the 
cognitive process underlying the retesting effect rather than the magnitude of said effect, 
the present study used a shorter, 7- to 10-day retest interval (based on the scheduling of 
participants).  That is, the stronger the retesting effect this protocol could engender, the 
more amenable it was to investigating the research questions of interest.  Furthermore, 
past research (e.g., Roediger & Karpickie, 2006a) has indicated that a 7-day retest 
interval is sufficient for obtaining the retesting effect. 
Following this 7-10 day retest interval, participants returned to the lab to 
complete the second administrations of the knowledge and ability test (Time 2).  
Participants again completed the test anxiety and test-taking motivation measures prior 
to completing the retests.  Participants were randomly assigned to either the same or 
alternate forms of the retests.  Assignment of participants to the same or alternate forms 
occurred across test construct domains (i.e., knowledge and ability).  That is, individuals 
assigned to the same form received the same forms of both the knowledge and ability 
tests, and individuals assigned to the alternate form received the alternate forms of both 
the knowledge and ability tests.  Again, the order of the knowledge and ability tests was 
counterbalanced across conditions.  Additionally, Test Forms A and B were 
counterbalanced across both conditions (same versus alternate test forms; corrective 
feedback versus no feedback) and time points, such that Test Form A was not always the 
initial test.  
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At the conclusion of the second study session, participants were debriefed as to 
the purpose of the study, paid for their participation, completed their payment receipt, 
and were thanked for their time and efforts.  Participants were asked to refrain from 
telling anyone about the study until after January 1st, 2015 (the anticipated data 
collection completion date), so that future participants were not furnished with 
information that might bias their participation or performance.  The first study (Time 1) 
session was approximately 1.5 hours in length.  The second and final study session 







Protocol for Time 1 and Time 2 Administration 
 
Time 1 Protocol 





0 Administrative Informed Consent 1 Minutes 1 Minutes 1 Minutes 
1 Individual Difference Measure Working Memory 
 
15 Minutes 15 Minutes 16 Minutes 
2 
Test Attitudes 
Test Anxiety (T1) 
Test-Taking Motivation (T1) 
 
8 Minutes 
8 Minutes  
16 Minutes 32 Minutes  
3 Individual Difference Measure General Mental Ability 15 Minutes 15 Minutes 47 Minutes 
4 
Initial Test Measures 
Knowledge Test Form A or B (T1) 




25 Minutes 1 Hour 12 Minutes 
5 Demographics 2 Minutes 2 Minutes 1 Hour 14 Minutes 
6 Between-Subjects Manipulation:  Item-Level Feedback versus Control 10 Minutes 10 Minutes 
1 Hour 
24 Minutes 
Time 2 Protocol 





1 Retest Interval Behavioral Inventory 2 Minutes 2 Minutes 2 Minutes 
2 
Test Attitudes 
Test Anxiety (T2) 




16 Minutes 18 Minutes  
3 
Retest Measures 
Knowledge Test Form A or B (T2) 




25 Minutes 43 Minutes 





Mirroring the design of the present study, the analyses and results are organized 
such that the (a) memory and (b) learning effects explanations for the retesting effect are 
pitted against each other such that either one or the other could be supported.  All 
analyses were conducted using SAS 9.2 PROC GLM.  This SAS procedure allows 
testing a multivariate generalized linear model containing both within and between 
subject variables, as well as using continuous variables (working memory and Raven’s 
APM).   
7.1 Descriptive Statistics and Control Variables 
Three-hundred seventy-four participants participated in the Day 1 session of the 
protocol.  Of those, three-hundred forty participants (mean age = 21.04 years old, SD = 
4.43, 238 females [70.00%], 76 Psychology majors [22.69%]) completed both Day 1 and 
Day 2 sessions of the retest protocol and comprised the final sample.  Thus, thirty-four 
participants were dropped from the analyses due to attrition.  For a comparison between 
the participants who completed versus attrited from the study protocol, see Table 6.  
Based on these analyses, only Time 1 ability scores significantly differed between 
participants who completed versus attrited.  However, participants who completed the 
study exhibited significantly lower ability scores at Time 1, opposite of what would be 
expected if participants who performed poorly did not anticipate they would receive the 
performance award.  Thus, there appears no reason to believe that there was any 






Mean Differences Between Participants Who Completed and Attrited from the 
Retest Protocol 
 
 Completed Participants a Attrited Participants b d Variable M SD M SD 
Age 21.04 4.43 20.59 1.31 0.14 
Raven’s APM 8.64 2.03 8.47 2.11 0.08 
Working Memory 3.74 .97 3.59 1.14 0.14 
Ability Score T1  34.67 7.48 37.82 8.29 0.40* 
Knowledge Score T1 20.21 5.21 19.91 5.11 0.06 
Test Motivation T1 3.84 .35 3.79 .32 0.06 
Test Anxiety T1 2.84 .56 2.97 .60 0.22 
Note. a N = 340. b N = 34. * p < .05. All significance tests are two-tailed 
Satterhwaite t-tests, which do not assume equal variances between groups. (There 
was no difference between the results using the traditional pooled variance t-tests 
between groups). 
 
7.1.1 Test Attitudes 
To test whether test motivation and test anxiety offered alternate explanations for 
the effects, and therefore whether they would be included as covariates, paired sample 
two-tailed t-tests were conducted.  Test motivation significantly decreased from Time 1 
to Time 2, opposite the anticipated direction (t (339) = 4.05, p < .05, d = 0.20).  Test 
anxiety increased; however, this increase was not significant (t (339) = -.77, p > .05, d = -
0.02).  Thus, test motivation and test anxiety were not included as covariates in the 
following analyses. 
7.1.2 Retest Interval Behaviors 
It is possible that participants engaged in activities and behaviors that may have 
improved their scores on the retest measures, regardless of the manipulations or the 
retesting intervention itself.  To assess whether participants’ behaviors during the retest 
interval could present an alternate explanation for the retest increases, mean differences 
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on ability and knowledge retest scores between the individuals who reported engaging in 
test-content related retest interval behaviors (or did not) were examined (see Table 7 and 
Table 8).  Retest interval behaviors were investigated across all of the study’s conditions.   
One-hundred fourteen participants reported that an instructor covered similar 
psychology content in a class after they completed the Day 1 protocol session (33.53%).  
Forty-two participants (12.35%) reported that they completed psychology course work 
(including reading, studying) that was relevant to the initial test’s content during the 
retest interval.  Participants who reported that they either had an instructor cover similar 
content in class or that they had completed related psychology course work (N = 73, 
21.47% [not all participants provided hours if they had indicated they covered similar 
course content]), reported that they spent on average 1.64 hours (SD = 2.24) on this 
coursework.  Thirty participants (8.82%) reported that they sought the answers of the 
tests’ items in some way between the initial and retest measures and that they spent on 
average .80 hours (SD = .47) seeking answers.  A single participant (.29%) reported that 
she/he had spent 3 hours engaged in test preparation activities for the GRE Psychology 





Mean Test Score Increases Between Participants Who Covered Test Content 
During Retest Interval 
 
  Covered in Class Did Not Cover in Class 
d   Participants a Participants b 




Score Increase  8.20 5.37 8.11 6.07 0.02 
Mean Knowledge 
Score Increase 2.15 4.55 3.35 5.61 -0.23 
     
 Covered in Class Did not Cover in Class 
d   Participants c Participants d 




Score Increase 5.98 6.68 5.65 5.68 0.06 
Mean Knowledge 
Score Increase 0.92 3.83 1.34 3.65 -0.11 
Note. a N = 60. b N = 109. c N = 60. d N = 111.  All significance tests are one-tailed 
Satterhwaite t-tests, which do not assume equal variances between groups. (There was no 
difference between the results using the traditional pooled variance t-tests between groups). 
 
There were no significant mean differences on knowledge and ability retest 
increases across same versus alternate retest forms between participants who covered 
relevant test material from their instructor, psychology course content, or sought answers 
during the retest interval.  In fact, many of these differences between the groups were in 
the opposite direction of what one would expect if these activities served as a plausible 
alternate explanation for the retest increases.  That is, participants who covered relevant 
test content or sought test answers during the retest interval performed worse on the 
retest than those who did not.  Furthermore, few participants reported engaging in these 
behaviors at all.  These results do not indicate that retest interval behaviors were 
associated with greater retest increases, and therefore do not offer a plausible alternate 
explanation for the retesting effect in the present study.   
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 Table 8 
 
Mean Test Score Increases Between Participants Who Sought Test Content 




Sought Test Answers 
 
Did Not Seek Test 
Answers d 
  Participants a Participants b 
 Variable M SD M SD 
Same 
Form 
Mean Ability Score 
Increase 9.87 5.36 7.96 5.87 0.33 
Mean Knowledge 
Score Increase -0.07 4.42 3.42 5.33 -0.66 
     
 Sought Test Answers Did not Seek Test Answers d   Participants c Participants d 
 Variable M SD M SD 
Alternate 
Form 
Mean Ability Score 
Increase 5.60 6.98 5.72 5.92 -0.02 
Mean Knowledge 
Score Increase -0.47 4.12 1.24 3.68 -0.46 
Note. a N = 15. b N = 136. c N = 15. d N = 148.  Twenty-six participants did not report whether 
or not they sought test answers during the retest interval.  All significance tests are one -tailed 
Satterhwaite t-tests, which do not assume equal variances between groups.  (There was no 
difference between the results using the traditional pooled variance t-tests between groups). 
 
Table 9 shows the descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations among the 
study variables.  The relationships between variables in the present study were in the 
anticipated direction.  All analyses were based on the raw scores.  However, for the 
purposes of interpretation, all test scores were standardized to total percent correct for 
the presented figures.  For hypothesized memory effects versus learning explanation 









Intercorrelations amongst Study Variables 
 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Individual Differences           
1. Raven’s APM 8.64 2.03 -        
2. Working Memory 3.74 0.97 0.35* -       
Time 1           
3. Ability Score T1  34.67 7.48 0.30* 0.26* -      
4. Knowledge Score  T1 20.21 5.20 0.21* 0.22* 0.35* -     
5. Ability RT T1 (ms) 12,991 3,126 -0.17* -0.18* -0.80* -0.24* -    
6. Knowledge RT T1 (ms) 19,040 4,881 0.02 -0.02 -0.37* -0.35* 0.42* -   
7. Test Motivation T1 3.84 0.35 0.12* 0.24* 0.11* -0.05 -0.04 0.00 (.72)  
8. Test Anxiety T1 2.84 0.56 -0.24* -0.23* -0.22* -0.25* 0.09 0.03 -0.15* (.64) 
Time 2           
9. Ability Score T2  41.62 7.02 0.27* 0.32* 0.65* 0.38* -0.54* -0.34* 0.14* -0.30* 
10. Knowledge Score  T2 22.26 6.15 0.25* 0.27* 0.25* 0.68* -0.09 -0.06 0.02 -0.28* 
11. Ability RT T2 (ms) 10,220 2,466 -0.10* -0.19* -0.54* -0.27* 0.58* 0.48* -0.02 0.13* 
12. Knowledge RT T2 (ms) 14,732 4,160 -0.10* -0.10* -0.32* -0.30* 0.33* 0.51* 0.01 0.09* 
13. Test Motivation T2 3.77 0.36 0.12* 0.10* 0.18* 0.06 -0.11* -0.09 0.65* -0.14 
14. Test Anxiety T2 2.85 0.52 -0.25* -0.26* -0.22* -0.34* 0.09 0.06 -0.13* 0.82* 
15. Retest Interval Length 
(Days) 7.61 1.19 -.06 .04 -.01 -.08 .00 .03 .08 -.04 
Note. N = 340. Raven’s APM = Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices.  RT = Response Time. ms = Milliseconds. T1 = Time 1. T2 = Time 2. 








Intercorrelations amongst Study Variables (Continued) 
 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Time 2       
9. Ability Score T2  -      
10. Knowledge Score  T2 0.42* -     
11. Ability RT T2 (ms) -0.69* -0.16* -    
12. Knowledge RT T2 (ms) -0.39* -0.21* 0.47* -   
13. Test Motivation T2 0.13* 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 (.74)  
14. Test Anxiety T2 -0.30* -0.35* 0.13* 0.05 -0.15* (.66) 
15. Retest Interval Length (Days) -.05 -.02 .08 .07 .00 -.04 
Note. N = 340. Raven’s APM = Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices.  RT = Response Time. ms = 
Milliseconds. T1 = Time 1. T2 = Time 2. Standardized coefficient alphas are reported along the diagonal in 








7.2 Hypothesis Testing 
7.2.1 Hypothesis 1.  To competitively test Hypotheses 1a versus 1b, a two-way 
(retest form; same form versus alternate form) repeated measures mixed factorial 
ANOVA was used to test differences in total test scores (collapsing across construct 
domains [knowledge and ability]).  There was a significant interaction of retest form 
(same versus alternate form) by time (F (2, 337) = 11.86, p < .05, η2 = .03), such that the 
magnitude of the retest increase was greater for same retest forms compared to alternate 
form retests.  There were also significant main effects for time (F (2, 337) = 6179.15, p < 
.05, η2 = .53) and test form (F (1, 338) = 3.29, p < .05, η2 = .17).  Thus, the results were 
supportive of Hypothesis 1a; in accordance with a memory explanation, the observed 







Figure 1. Hypotheses 1 and 3: Total test score (percentage) by same form retest versus 
alternate form retest over time. 
 
7.2.2 Hypothesis 2.  To competitively test Hypotheses 2a versus 2b, a two-way 
(retest form; same form versus alternate form) repeated measures mixed factorial 
ANOVA testing differences in mean item response times (collapsing across construct 
domains [knowledge and ability]) was used.  There was a significant interaction of retest 
form (same form versus alternate form) by time (F (2, 337) =  24.10, p < .05, η2 = .03), 
such that mean item response times were faster for same form retest compared to 
alternate form retests.  There were also significant main effects for time (F (2, 337) = 
4301.68, p < .05, η2 = .63) and test form (F (1, 338) = 5.39, p < .05, η2 = .02) on mean item 












Initial Test Same Form Retest Alternate Form
Retest



























a memory explanation rather than learning, the observed retest mean item response times 
were faster on the same form retest compared to the alternate form retest (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Hypothesis 2: Mean item response time by same form retest versus 
alternate form retest over time.  
 
7.2.3 Hypothesis 3.  To competitively test Hypotheses 3a and 3b, a three-way 
(retest form, same form versus alternate form; by construct type, ability and knowledge) 
repeated measures mixed factorial ANOVA testing differences in total test scores was 
used.  Construct domain was included as a within subjects variable.  Support for 
Hypothesis 3a, that memory best explains the retest score increases, would be found if 
there is a significant interaction of same versus alternate form retest by time, but no 
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larger on the same form retest compared to the alternate form retest (irrespective of the 
construct domain).  Support for Hypothesis 3b, that learning best explains the retest 
score increases, would be found if a significant three-way interaction is observed 
between construct domain and total test scores increases from Time 1 to Time 2, such 
that the magnitude of the retest score increase is greater for knowledge compared to 
ability, yet there is no significantly greater retest increase for same form retest compared 
to alternate form retest.   
There was a significant interaction of retest form by time (as reported in 
Hypothesis 1 above); however, there was no significant three-way interaction by 
construct domain (F (2, 337) = .54, p > .05, η2 = .00).  Furthermore, there was a significant 
two-way interaction of construct domain over time, which was the opposite of the 
hypothesized direction (F (2, 337) = 1281.47, p < .05, η2 = .35).  That is, the ability test 
showed greater retest score increases compared to the knowledge test (irrespective of 
test form changes).  Thus, the pattern of results were supportive of Hypothesis 3a; in 
accordance with a memory explanation rather than a learning explanation, the observed 
retest score increases were higher on the same form compared to the alternate form, but 
the magnitude was no different between knowledge and ability constructs (see Figure 1). 
7.2.4 Hypothesis 4.  Hypotheses 4a versus 4b was tested by comparing the 
influence of GMA and the magnitude of the retest score increase for the same and 
alternate form retests, and the influence of working memory capacity and the magnitude 
of retest score increase for the same and alternate form retests.  Support for Hypothesis 





significantly stronger correlation between working memory capacity and retest score 
increases compared to GMA and retest score increases, and that the magnitude of 
working memory capacity-retest scores increases is of a greater magnitude for same 
form retest rather than alternate form retest.  Conversely, support for Hypothesis 4b, that 
learning best explains the retest score increases, would be found if there is a significantly 
stronger influence of GMA and retest score increases compared to the relationship 
between working memory capacity and retest score increases, irrespective of test-takers 
completing the same form retest or alternate form retest.   
Hypotheses 4 was tested using the generalized linear model, including the retest 
form manipulation and both the individual differences (GMA and working memory) as 
predictors of retest score increases.  There was a significant main effect of GMA over 
time, indicating that GMA was related to the magnitude of retest increases (F (18, 360) = 
1.99, p < .05, η2 = .03), thus, demonstrating some evidence for learning.  There was a 
significant interaction of working memory by retest form on the magnitude of retest 
increases (F (54, 360) = 1.32, p < .05, η2 = .08).  There was no significant main effect of 
working memory on retesting effects (F (94, 360) = 1.22, p > .05, η2 = .12).  Thus, the 
pattern of results was supportive of Hypothesis 4a; in accordance with a memory 
explanation, the observed retest score increases were higher on the same form compared 
to the alternate form, and this effect was stronger for individuals with higher working 






Figure 3. Hypothesis 4: GMA and working memory predicting retest score 
increases by same form retest versus alternate form retest. 
  Note. Effect sizes are r’s. * p < .05. 
 
7.2.5 Hypothesis 5.  Hypothesis 5a versus 5b were competitively tested using a 2 
(retest form; same form versus alternate form) × 2 (corrective feedback versus no 
feedback) repeated measures mixed factorial ANOVA (collapsing across construct 
domains [knowledge and ability]).  Support for Hypothesis 5a, that memory best 
explains the retest score increases, would be found if there was a three-way interaction 
of retest form and corrective feedback on retest score increases, such that the magnitude 
of the retest score increase is greatest for the corrective feedback condition on the same 
form retest compared to the alternate form retest.  Support for Hypothesis 5b, that 


























































































































interactive effect of corrective feedback on retest score increase, but of a similar 
magnitude whether test-takers completed the same form retest or alternate form retest.   
There was a significant three-way interaction of retest form by feedback 
manipulation by time (F (2, 335) = 9.95, p < .05, η2 = .01); such that there was a greater 
retesting effect from corrective feedback on same form rather than alternate form.  There 
were significant main effects of retest form over time (F (2, 335) = 13.90, p < .05, η2 = .03) 
and corrective feedback over time (F (2, 335) = 15.64, p < .05, η2 = .03).  Thus, the patterns 
of results were supportive of Hypothesis 5a; in accordance with a memory explanation 
rather than learning, the observed retest score increases were higher on the same retest 
form compared to the alternate retest form, and this effect was stronger when 






Figure 4. Hypothesis 5: Total test score (percentage) by same form retest versus 
alternate form retest over time (collapsed across knowledge and ability). 
 
7.2.6 Hypothesis 6.  Hypothesis 6a versus 6b were tested using a 2 (retest form; 
same form retest versus alternate form retest) × 2 (corrective feedback versus no 
feedback) repeated measures mixed factorial ANOVA examining the differences in 
mean item response times (collapsing across construct domains [knowledge and 
ability]).  Support for Hypothesis 6a, that memory best explains the decreased retest item 
response time, would be found if there was a significant three-way interactive effect of 
corrective feedback condition with retest form on mean retest item response times, such 







































significantly larger magnitude on same form retest compared to alternate form retest.  
Support for Hypothesis 6b, that learning best explains the decreased retest item response 
time, would be found if there was a significant effect of corrective feedback on mean 
item response time, such that faster mean item response times scores are observed with 
corrective feedback, but of a similar magnitude whether test-takers completed the same 
form retest or alternate form retest.  There was no significant three-way interaction of 
time by retest form by feedback manipulation (F (2, 335) = 1.52, p > .05, η2 = .00).  There 
were significant main effects of the retest form manipulation over time (F (2, 335) = 24.62, 
p < .05, η2 = .03), but no effect of the feedback manipulation over time (F (2, 335) = 1.88, p 
> .05, η2 = .00).  Thus, there was no conclusive support for either Hypothesis 6a or 6b; 
in general, the pattern of results did not display clear support for either a memory or 






Figure 5. Hypothesis 6: Mean item response time by same versus alternate form retest 
with corrective feedback or no corrective feedback over time (collapsed across 
knowledge and ability).  
 
7.2.7 Hypothesis 7.  Hypotheses 7a versus 7b was tested using a 2 (retest form; 
same form versus alternate form) × 2 (corrective feedback versus no feedback) × 2 
(construct domain, ability or knowledge, within-subjects) repeated measures mixed 
factorial ANOVA examining differences on total test scores.  Support for Hypothesis 7a, 
that memory best explains the retest score increases, would be found if there was a three-
way interaction of retest form and corrective feedback on retest score increases, such 
that the magnitude of the retest score increase is greater for the corrective feedback 
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similar magnitude across construct domains.  Support for Hypothesis 7b, that learning 
best explains the retest score increases, would be found if there was an interactive effect 
of corrective feedback and construct domain on retest score increase, such that the 
magnitude of the retest score increase is greatest for the corrective feedback condition on 
knowledge compared to ability, but of a similar magnitude whether test-takers 
completed the same form retest or alternate form retest.  However, there was no 
significant 4-way interaction indicating that this differed by construct domain (F (2, 335) = 
.69, p > .05, η2 = .00).  Thus, the pattern of results was supportive of Hypothesis 7a; in 
accordance with a memory explanation, the observed retest score increases were higher 
on the same retest form compared to the alternate retest form, and this effect was 
stronger when participants were provided corrective feedback, but the magnitude was no 






 Figure 6. Hypothesis 7. Total test score (percentage) by same versus alternate 
form retest with corrective feedback or no corrective feedback over time. 
 
7.2.8 Hypothesis 8.  Support for Hypothesis 8a, that memory best explains the 
retest score increases, would be found if working memory capacity has a stronger 
influence on retest score increases compared to the influence of GMA on retest score 
increases in the corrective feedback condition compared to the no feedback condition, 
and that the magnitude of working memory capacity-retest score increases correlation is 
of greater magnitude for same form retest than alternate form retest.  Conversely, 
support for Hypothesis 8b, that learning best explains the retest score increases, would 
be found if there was a significantly stronger influence of GMA on retest score increases 

















































corrective feedback condition compared to the control condition, but that there is no 
difference between same form retest versus alternate form retest. 
There was no significant three-way interaction for GMA by corrective feedback 
over time (F (16, 360) = 1.44, p > .05, η2 = .02), irrespective of retest form; thus, 
demonstrating no evidence of learning effects.  However, there was no significant four-
way interaction for working memory by retest form manipulation by corrective feedback 
over time (F (32, 360) = .72, p > .05, η2 = .02); thus, demonstrating no evidence of memory 
effects either.  In general, the pattern of results did not display conclusive support for 
either a memory (Hypothesis 8a) or learning explanation (Hypothesis 8b).  Specifically, 
the observed retest score increases were higher on the same form compared to the 
alternate form, and this effect was again stronger for individuals receiving corrective 
feedback, but these effects were not moderated by either working memory capacity or 







Figure 7. Hypothesis 8: GMA and working memory predicting retest score increases by 
same form retest versus alternate form retest with corrective feedback and no feedback  
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8.  DISCUSSION 
It is clear that the retesting effect consistently influences the test scores that 
organizations, educators, and policy-makers use to make decisions across work, 
educational, and social settings.   Despite the divergent and significant implications for 
retesting practices that a learning versus a memory explanation holds, a lack of 
integrated research between cognitive, education, and personnel researchers limits 
advancements in this domain and consequentially, the ability to make clear evidence-
based recommendations.  Theoretically, delineating whether learning or memory best 
accounts for the retesting effect is the major contribution of the present study to the 
psychology, education, and management literatures.  Practically, these findings offer 




reflect meaningful learning across retest forms, but instead the memory of previous 
responses that are in fact dependent upon test-specific information. 
Table 10 summarizes the results of this study’s competing hypotheses.  
Generally, these results supported the explanation that the retesting effect reflects 
memory, rather than learning.  Overall, there was a consistent and significant interaction 
of retesting by same versus alternate retest form, regardless of manipulations (corrective 
feedback or no feedback) or constructs (knowledge versus ability).  That is, retest 
increases were significantly attenuated by alternate retest forms and these effects were 
stronger when corrective feedback was provided; however, the magnitude of the retest 
increases did not differ by constructs (knowledge versus ability).  Furthermore, retesting 
resulted in significantly faster item response times, but again, these response times were 





Competitive Hypotheses supporting Memory Effects versus Learning Explanations 
 
Hypotheses If memory effects best explains the retesting effect  
If learning best explains the 
retesting effect  Results Supported? 
1 
(a) Retest scores will be higher than 
initial scores; however, the magnitude 
of this effect will be larger on the same 
form retest than the alternate form 
retest. 
 
(b) Retest scores will be higher than 
initial test scores and the magnitude of 
this effect will be similar for both the 
same and alternate form retests.   
Retest scores were higher than 
initial test scores, but of a 
greater on same forms (F (2, 337) 




(a) Retest response times will be faster 
than initial test response times. 
However, the magnitude of the 
difference between the initial and 
retest response times will be larger on 
the same form retest than the alternate 
form retest. 
 
(b) Retest response times will be faster 
than initial test response times.  
However, the magnitude of the 
difference between the initial and 
retest response time for the same and 
alternate form retest will be small (i.e., 
similar). 
 
Retest response times were 
faster than initial test response 
times, such that mean item 
response times were faster for 
same forms compared to 
alternate form retests (F (2, 337) =  




(a) Retest score increases from initial 
test scores will be approximately equal 
for knowledge and ability; however, 
the magnitude of this retest increase 
will be larger on the same form retest 
compared to the alternate form retest 
(across construct domains). 
 
(b) Retest score increases from initial 
test scores will be higher for 
knowledge than ability, irrespective of 
whether the same or alternate form 
retest is administered. 
There was no significant three-
way interaction of retest score 
gains by construct domain (F (2, 







Competitive Hypotheses supporting Memory Effects versus Learning Explanations (Continued) 
 
Hypotheses If memory effects best explains the retesting effect  
If learning best explains the 
retesting effect  Results Supported? 
4 
(a) The relationship between working 
memory capacity and retest score 
increases will be stronger than the 
relationship between GMA and retest 
scores increases and be of greater 
magnitude for the same form retest than 
the alternate form retests.   
(b) The relationship between GMA 
and retest score increases will be 
stronger than the relationship between 
working memory capacity and retest 
scores increases and be of a similar 
magnitude between the same form 
retest and the alternate form retest.   
There was a significant 
interaction of working memory 
by retest form on the magnitude 
of retest increases, such that 
working memory had a greater 
effect on test scores for same 
versus alternate forms (F (54, 360) 





(a) Retest score increases will be higher 
for the corrective feedback condition 
compared to the no corrective feedback 
condition; however, the magnitude of 
this effect will be larger on the same 
form retest than the alternate form retest. 
(b) Retest score increases will be 
higher for the corrective feedback 
condition compared to the no 
corrective feedback condition and the 
magnitude of this effect will be similar 
for both the same form retest and 
alternate form retest. 
 
Retest score increases were 
greatest with corrective 
feedback on same form rather 
than alternate form (F (2, 335) = 




(a) Retest response times will be faster 
than initial test response times for the 
corrective feedback condition compared 
to the no corrective feedback condition.  
However, the magnitude of the 
difference between the initial and retest 
response times will be larger on the 
same form retest than the alternate form 
retest. 
(b) Retest response times will be faster 
than initial test response times for the 
corrective feedback condition 
compared to the no corrective 
feedback condition and the magnitude 
of this effect will be similar for both 
the same form retest and alternate 
form retest. 
There was no significant three-
way interaction of retest form 
by feedback manipulation on 
retest response times (F (2, 







Competitive Hypotheses supporting Memory Effects versus Learning Explanations (Continued) 
 
Hypotheses If memory effects best explains the retesting effect  
If learning best explains the 
retesting effect  Results Supported? 
7 
(a) Retest score increases will be 
approximately equal for ability and 
knowledge, but exhibit an interactive 
effect between receiving corrective 
feedback conditions and retest form, 
such that receiving corrective 
feedback will increase retest scores at 
a greater magnitude for the same form 
retest than the alternate form retest.   
 
(b) Retest score increases will be 
higher for knowledge than ability and 
exhibit an interactive effect with 
corrective feedback condition, such 
that receiving corrective feedback will 
increase retest scores at a greater 
magnitude for knowledge than ability, 
but the magnitude of this effect will be 
similar for the same form retest and 
alternate form retest.   
 
Construct domain did not 
interact with corrective feedback 
conditions and retest form to 
increase the magnitude of retest 
increases (F (2, 335) = .69, p > .05, 
η2 = .00).   Memory Explanation 
8 
(a) A stronger relationship will exist 
between working memory capacity 
and retest score increases compared to 
GMA and retest score increases for 
the corrective feedback condition 
compared to the no corrective 
feedback condition, and the magnitude 
of this relationship will be larger on 
the same form retest than the alternate 
form retest. 
(b) A stronger relationship will exist 
between GMA and retest score 
increases compared to working 
memory capacity and retest score 
increases for the corrective feedback 
condition compared to the no 
corrective feedback condition, and the 
magnitude of this relationship will be 
similar for both the same form retest 
and alternate form retest.   
Neither GMA across forms (F 
(16, 360) = 1.44, p > .05, η2 = .02) 
nor working memory within 
same forms (F (32, 360) = .72, p > 
.05, η2 = .02) interacted with 
corrective feedback to increase 




Results related to corrective feedback were less conclusive.  The lack of main 
effects of corrective feedback on retest increases for Hypotheses 6A versus 6B and 
Hypotheses 8A versus 8B made it difficult to draw support for either memory or 
learning explanations.  Hypothesis 2A was supported: test-takers completed items 
significantly faster upon retest, but this was attenuated by alternate retest forms.  
However, neither Hypothesis 6A nor 6B were conclusively supported: corrective 
feedback did not accelerate mean item response times regardless of retest forms (i.e., 
evidence of learning) nor did corrective feedback accelerate mean item response times to 
a greater extent on same versus alternate form retests (i.e., evidence of memory).  
Hypotheses 4 and 8 showed a similar pattern.  Hypothesis 4A supported memory effects: 
greater working memory capacity was related to greater retest increases on same, but not 
alternate retest forms.  However, neither Hypothesis 8A nor 8B were conclusively 
supported: corrective feedback did not facilitate the magnitude of this effect.  Working 
memory capacity did not interact with corrective feedback to produce greater score gains 
for the same form retest.   
As indicated by the nonsignificant effects of corrective feedback on retest 
increases across hypotheses, it appears that corrective feedback was a less powerful 
manipulation than intended, potentially limiting the ability to effectively examine the 
learning versus memory explanations for these hypotheses.  Despite a substantial sample 
(N = 340), the post hoc power analysis indicated what appeared to be quite low power (β 
power level = .12); in fact, what appeared to be too low to detect almost any significant 
differences between corrective feedback on knowledge versus ability tests.  Given the 
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effect sizes found, 8,771 participants would be necessary to achieve a power of .80 to 
detect this difference.  
The goal of selecting this particular hypothesis for the power analysis was to 
establish a conservative test as to whether learning occurred compared to the assumption 
that memory effects occurred regardless of intervention.  In this power analysis, 
evidence for the memory explanation was the null hypothesis: that there would be no 
difference between the effect of corrective feedback on knowledge retest increases 
compared to ability retest increases.  The power analysis estimated the sample size 
required to detect evidence for the learning explanation, that corrective feedback 
facilitated greater retest increases on knowledge tests compared to ability tests.  As 
indicated in Table 3, the present study’s effect size of corrective feedback on ability and 
knowledge retest increases were of comparable size to meta-analytic estimates, but quite 
similar to one another in magnitude.  In fact, the present study showed a greater effect of 
corrective feedback on the ability retest than previously reported in the meta-analytic 
literature (d = 0.31 compared to 0.22, Hausknecht et al., 2007).   
This similarity in effect sizes of corrective feedback on ability and knowledge 
retest increases likely reflects meaningful similarities between the influence of corrective 
feedback on retest increases across constructs.  Under the memory explanation, which 
was predominantly supported, hypothesized differences between the effect sizes of 
corrective feedback for ability versus knowledge tests would be zero.  That is, if 
individuals were simply remembering and repeating prior responses, rather than learning 
from testing, and that corrective feedback facilitated remembering those responses, this 
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process should not differ between ability and knowledge tests.  Thus, the post hoc power 
analysis appears to indicate a low power level, but may actually indicate a meaningful 
similarity between these effects.   
Additionally, this study accounted for three common methodological challenges 
when investigating the retesting effect, specifically, test attitudes, length of the retest 
interval, and attrition.  Various test attitudes have been proffered as explanations for the 
resting effect and a potential boundary condition on the value of retesting as a means for 
improving learning (Reeve et al., 2009); yet no studies have examined test attitudes over 
time or how test attitudes may covary with retest increases.  The present study’s results 
indicated no significant effect of either test motivation or test anxiety over time.  Test 
attitudes are further discussed in the Limitations section.   
The extant literature has proposed that retesting is a viable learning intervention 
across quite variable retest intervals, from months to minutes.  For example, research has 
shown that the benefits of retesting occur after retest interval delays of only minutes (0–
20 minutes) to almost a year (Carpenter et al., 2009).  Some studies have demonstrated 
that longer retest intervals may exhibit greater retesting effects (e.g., J. C. K. Chan, 
2009; C. I. Johnson & Mayer, 2009; Kornell, Bjork, & Garcia, 2011; Roediger & 
Karpicke, 2006b); whereas others indicate that the retesting effect diminishes over time 
(Hausknecht et al., 2007).  The majority of research has used retest intervals of at least 1 
day with a modal retention interval of 1 week (Carretta et al., 2000), which consequently 
served as the basis for the present study’s retest interval of 7-10 days.  Considering the 
variability of retest intervals used in the literature, and the possibility that the length of 
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retest interval may moderate the magnitude of the retesting effect, the effect of the 
variability in the present study’s retest interval of 7 and 10 day (4 days) was examined.  
These results indicated that the present study’s retest interval length did not have any 
relationship with the variables of interest, nor did the length of the retest interval 
significantly predict either ability or knowledge test score increases (r = -.04, r = .06, 
respectively).  So on the basis of these results, it was deemed unwarranted to statistically 
control for the variability of the retest interval.  
Finally, attrition was examined as a potentially systematic selection bias threat 
that could influence the study’s results.  The results of this examination indicated the 
absence of any meaningful differences between participants who completed versus 
attrited after the initial test scores or any individual difference variables that were 
collected at Time 1 (see Table 6).  Participants who completed the protocol were not 
higher on any relevant individual differences (working memory capacity, GMA), nor 
were they more motivated or less anxious.  Participants who attrited did not perform 
worse on either initial knowledge or ability tests.  Thus, it does not appear that a 
particular kind of participant (e.g., more test anxious or with lower GMA) systematically 
attrited from the study, or that they left the study based on their initial test performance.   
Systematic attrition has the potential to dramatically confound retesting research 
in operational settings.  For example, particular test-takers may systematically self-select 
out before retesting or even be selected, precluding the need for retesting.  In either case, 
operational test settings often compare quite different samples between the initial test 
and retest, obscuring the retesting effect.  Therefore, a strength of the present design is 
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that the full, rather than truncated, sample was used, which allows for a more robust 
examination of the retesting effect that is unrelated to the confounding effect of attrition. 
8.1 Implications 
The prevalence and influence of the retesting effect on the scientific community 
and society at large underscores the importance of understanding whether these retest 
increases reflect either learning or memory.  The extant literature provides support for 
both explanations of the retesting effect; however, a memory versus a learning 
explanation would offer quite divergent scientific and practical implications.  These 
divergent explanations fundamentally alter the interpretation of retest scores for both 
knowledge and ability constructs in science and its implications for practice across 
research domains.  Consequently, the primary contribution of this work lies in providing 
support for the conclusion that memory, rather than learning, appears to better explain 
the retesting effect, and therefore offers insight into the processes that affect the 
inferences drawn from retest scores and the benefits of testing as a learning intervention.  
By demonstrating that retest score increases best reflect memory, rather than 
learning, researchers and practitioners should exercise caution when assuming that retest 
increases reflect learning when the alternate memory explanation is also possible (e.g., 
same form retests are used, corrective feedback is provided, a short retest interval is 
used).  Relatedly, researchers and practitioners should consider the purpose of testing 
when implementing regular testing programs and retesting policies: Is retesting for 
assessment and decision-making (e.g., academic and employment selection)?  Or for 
providing feedback and formative assessment under contexts where learning is expected 
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and encouraged (e.g., education settings, during training programs)? Although the 
present study provides evidence supporting the memory explanation, understanding the 
effects of repeated testing on future test performance within its context and purpose 
offers greater utility to practitioners, rather than assuming that testing inherently 
facilitates either learning or memory effects.  Nevertheless, it is important to note that 
the present study did not examine retest increases in the context of criterion-related 
validity relationships; thus, future research using academic and employment settings and 
criteria are likely to add additional insights.   
8.1.1 Scientific Implications.  The retesting effect is a robust empirical finding 
observed since the earliest studies in psychology and has also been observed across 
construct domains, academic and applied settings, and lab and operational settings.  Yet 
much less is known about the benefits of testing on the application and transfer of this 
performance increase and the cognitive processes underlying this effect (Bjork & Bjork, 
1992; Carpenter, 2012).  Specifically, the major scientific implication of these results are 
to answer the call to investigate whether tests can promote the transfer of learned 
constructs across time, test forms, and construct domains or if these effects are bound to 
test-specific information (Carpenter, 2012).  Greater understanding as to whether the 
retesting effect is best explained by memory rather than learning has implications for 
both the measurement of psychological constructs and the possibility that tests assess as 
well as teach (Carpenter, 2012; Dunlosky et al., 2013; Pashler et al., 2007; Roediger & 
Karpicke, 2006a).  The extant literature makes it apparent that testing influences retest 
score gains and offers insight into the cognitive processes underlying memory (Bjork & 
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Bjork, 1992; Carpenter, 2012).  However, on the basis of the present study’s results, 
memory appears to better account for retest increases which suggests that retesting is 
unlikely to be viable learning intervention.   
Research consistently supports the spreading activation theory of retesting, 
whereby the cognitive processes of learning and memory comprise both an encoding and 
retrieval process.  That is, individuals first make connections between cognitions 
(encoding) but then must access these previously encoded connections and produce a 
response (retrieval; Bjork & Bjork, 1992; Karpicke & Blunt, 2011).  These processes are 
not necessarily distinct or directly observable when retest increases occur; thus, it is 
difficult to separate whether retest increases facilitate encoding or retrieval as both are 
necessary to produce a response.  Furthermore, spreading activation theory appears more 
applicable as an explanation for the retesting effect on knowledge tests, yet this is less 
conceptually transparent in the context of the robust and consistent effect of retesting on 
ability tests.   
The present study showed no differences in the pattern or magnitude of retest 
increases across the knowledge and ability construct domains.  That is, spreading 
activation theory would posit different processes for the retesting effect on knowledge 
versus ability constructs (which were not observed), and if spreading activation reflected 
encoding new information rather than merely retrieving previously encoded information, 
then there should be no differences between same versus alternate retest forms (which 
were observed).  Thus, spreading activation theory’s relevance to the retesting effect’s 
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benefit appears bound to facilitating the retrieval of test-specific information, rather than 
developing the underlying construct. 
The elucidation of these causal mechanisms is not trivial.  The retesting effect 
shapes the inferences drawn from retest scores and has been used to justify the use of 
testing not only for evaluation, but as a learning intervention.  Ultimately, the use and 
interpretation of repeated testing shapes the scientific community’s understanding of 
how and why knowledge and abilities change over time.  The present study was 
designed such that memory versus learning explanations were competitively examined 
as mutually exclusive processes for the retesting effect.  However, the retesting effect 
may reflect numerous and complex underlying processes (Reeve & Lam, 2005).  In 
accordance with this proposition, the retesting effect has been shown to not only increase 
mean retest scores, but also reduce the construct loading of a retest or even 
fundamentally alter which construct is assessed (Lievens et al., 2007).  Thus, it seems 
possible that both memory and learning effects occur upon retesting.   
Within the present research design, the data indicate that it is plausible that both 
learning and memory effects occurred, but that comparatively, the effects for memory 
were stronger than those for learning.  Even when memory effects were experimentally 
controlled using alternate retest forms, retest increases still occurred.  Similarly, retest 
mean item response time decreased on alternate forms, even when memory effects were 
experimentally controlled.  Furthermore, one may posit that the present study’s 
inconclusive results in terms of the relationship between individual differences and retest 
increases may be indicative of a learning explanation.  As detailed previously, 
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individuals with greater GMA benefit more from learning interventions (Ackerman, 
1987, 1988; Jensen, 1998; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998).  Previous research has reported 
somewhat contradictory evidence for the relationship between GMA and retest 
increases.  Test-takers with greater abilities sometimes achieve greater retest gains (e.g., 
Kulik et al., 1984; Kulik et al., 1984), yet other researchers have found that retest 
increases are unrelated to GMA (e.g., Coyle, 2006) or even that the lowest GMA test-
takers exhibit the greatest retest increases (te Nijenhuis et al., 2007).  Although 
Hypothesis 4A was supported, in that working memory capacity exhibited a stronger 
relationship with retest score increases for same retest forms, there was a main effect of 
GMA on the magnitude of retest score increases.   
The objective of the present study was to examine which explanation, memory 
versus learning, was best supported, not necessarily to compare the magnitude of these 
explanations.  Thus, an alternate interpretation of the present study’s results may be that, 
after memory effects were experimentally controlled, any remaining retest increases 
reflected some degree of learning and test-takers with greater GMA benefited more from 
this learning intervention.  Considering this possibility, future research may lend 
additional insights into this particular issue by (1) using more precise measures to detect 
these evidently smaller effects, (2) employing more robust retesting interventions (e.g., 
multiple retests, more elaborate feedback), and (3) examining the test-taking behaviors 




8.1.2 Practical Implications.  Despite a lack of integrated or conclusive research 
regarding explanations for the retesting effect, retesting and retesting policies exert a 
profound impact on individuals and organizations across applied, educational, and policy 
domains by affecting the inferences that test users draw from test scores and score 
changes.  The interpretation of the retesting effect as best explained by memory or 
learning affects the inferences drawn from test scores, and therefore, affects both 
retesting policy for assessment and the potential use of testing as a learning intervention.  
Based on the present evidence, the retesting effect appears best explained by memory, 
rather than learning, suggesting two primary implications for practitioners: (1) drawing 
conclusions based purely on retest scores likely leads to poorer and less-informed 
decisions and (2) implementing retesting for learning purposes is unlikely to 
meaningfully generalize to external learning, training, and performance criteria.   
In the workplace, tests of knowledge and ability are used to make a multitude of 
human resource management decisions.  In educational settings, tests are used to decide 
who receives education and to determine who has been successful in that education.  In 
public settings, tests are used to decide who will be permitted to provide healthcare, 
manage finances, and make legal decisions.  Incorrectly interpreting the influence of the 
retesting effect on test scores risks significant consequences to both individuals and 
society by potentially rewarding (denying) credentials, jobs, opportunities, and 
promotions to (un)qualified test-takers (Millman, 1989).  Nevertheless, it is important to 
note that although the results did not support testing as a learning intervention, this does 
not indicate that a retest can never show evidence that learning has occurred.  Instead, 
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interpreting retest scores requires careful consideration of other relevant learning 
mechanisms that may have occurred between an initial test and retest (e.g., additional 
study, training, education, and experiences).  
Researchers present an extensive literature supporting the position that testing 
functions as a learning intervention for even complex concepts across educational 
materials (McDaniel et al., 2007; Pashler et al., 2007; Roediger & Karpicke, 2006a).  
These proponents also point out the indirect benefits of regular testing, such as 
encouraging self-evaluation and consequently, more focused learning (e.g., dynamic 
testing, formative assessment, Roediger and Karpicke 2006a).  Indeed, many studies 
have shown that integrating regular testing into educational curricula shows beneficial 
results, regardless of the retesting effect (Pennebaker et al., 2013).  So whereas the 
present study failed to provide support for the learning explanation and the viability of 
retesting as a learning intervention, these results do not preclude the potential benefit of 
regular testing as a complement to more familiar teaching practices.   
Common teaching methods (e.g., additional study time, concept mapping) focus 
heavily on elaborative study which relies on memory encoding and strengthening of 
links between ideas, rather than practicing the retrieval of previously learned 
information.  However, in terms of effective retrieval, many of these learning activities 
have been shown to be less effective than testing alone (Karpicke & Blunt, 2011).  This 
distinction between encoding and retrieval mirrors the memory and learning 
explanations for the retesting effect.  Perhaps due to this lack of translation across 
research domains and multiple pathways of causality, the evidence that testing is 
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beneficial through retrieval practice is often overlooked by education and personnel 
practitioners and therefore, rarely incorporated into educational practice and policy 
(Pashler et al., 2007).  Considering the present study’s results, it is difficult to justify 
implementing testing as a learning intervention per se; however, this does not preclude 
indirect benefits of retesting in learning settings.  
8.2 Limitations 
Two potential limitations associated with the design of the present study are 
acknowledged.  Specifically, the nature of a low-stakes test setting and multiple-choice 
item format may have attenuated the magnitude of these retest increases; yet these 
design characteristics seem unlikely to have affected the fundamental pattern of these 
results.    
The study’s design was selected to exploit the experimental control of a 
laboratory setting and capitalize on an initial level of content domain knowledge 
(general psychology) from a population that was readily available.  This made it possible 
to examine the research questions, but was, inherently, low-stakes.  Compared to high-
stakes tests used to make decisions about an individual’s academic standing or 
employment, it is possible that the relatively low-stakes nature of these tests’ 
consequences impacted the magnitude of retest increases.  Considering the present 
study's recruiting methods, it also possible that a particular subset of individuals 
systematically self-selected into the study (greater comfort with tests, desire to learn 
more).  Nevertheless, participants reported mid to high test motivation (M = 3.84, SD 
=0.35, at Time 1; M = 3.77, SD = 0.36, at Time 2) and low to mid test anxiety (M = 2.84, 
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SD = 0.56, at Time 1; M = 2.85, SD = 0.52, at Time 2) and this did not affect the 
magnitude of retest score gains.  Extensive previous research shows that the retesting 
effect generalizes across diverse populations of learners as well as laboratory, 
occupational, and educational contexts.  Nevertheless, future research may offer 
additional insights by investigating learning versus memory effects using a similar 
design and measures in high-stakes testing environments such as operational education 
or employment settings.    
Research investigating the retesting effect consistently demonstrates that using 
multiple-choice items on initial tests exhibit smaller retest scores gains compared to 
constructed response item formats (e.g., Carpenter & DeLosh, 2006; Foos & Fisher, 
1988; Hamaker, 1986; McDaniel et al., 2007).  Two primary explanations for these 
smaller retest increases have been offered: (1) multiple-choice items present the keyed 
response which allows test-takers to simply  recognize the keyed response upon retest, or 
that (2) multiple-choice items present the keyed responses among alternatives which 
provides additional cues for test-takers to recognize the correct response (Roediger & 
Marsh, 2005).  Regardless of the explanation, this suggests that using multiple-choice 
items may have reduced the overall magnitude of this study to detect evidence of either 
learning or memory effects.   
Multiple-choice tests do, however, still facilitate retest score gains greater than 
simply restudying the same test content (McDaniel et al., 2007) and in some cases, 
actually generate greater retest gains than other item formats.  For example, when initial 
tests contain plausible nonkeyed alternatives, test-takers must retrieve why the correct 
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alternatives were correct and why the incorrect alternatives were incorrect, thus 
developing more effective retrieval processes (Little et al., 2012).  Item format clearly 
moderates the magnitude of the retesting effect; however, it seems unlikely that item 
format alters the underlying causal mechanism of the retesting effect.  It is possible that 
test-takers could learn information, from either the same or alternate form, that allows 
them to eliminate multiple-choice alternative options in retest items.  Nevertheless, this 
could reflect either learning versus memory effects, and therefore alternate item formats 
offer researchers an additional method to control for the effect of merely recognizing 
alternatives as cues.  Relatedly, items that assess more complex knowledge domains 
compared to simpler memory of individual facts could be used to further explore 
learning versus memory effects.  Does the magnitude of retest increases differ for 
declarative knowledge measures versus procedural knowledge measures?  Are these 
retest increases more or less attenuated by alternate test forms? 
8.3 Future Directions 
The results of the present study offer three avenues for future research: (1) 
negative transfer and response-changing upon retesting, (2) the effect of meta-cognition 
on retesting, and (3) investigating other theoretical explanations for facilitating learning 
using retesting (e.g., working memory training).   
8.3.1 Negative Transfer.  It is curious to note the relatively low test-retest 
reliability coefficients between initial tests and retests on alternate forms (e.g., as low as 
.58 and .64 for alternate ability test forms, compared to .76 and .70 for same forms).  
However, even same form knowledge retests showed a low test-retest reliability of only 
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.60, below commonly accepted standards for operational tests.  Although retest 
decreases were not the focus of the present study, these relatively low test-retest 
reliabilities imply that retest scores fluctuated both up and down over time, regardless of 
same versus alternate form tests and construct domain (knowledge versus ability).  
Clearly, some participants exhibited negative transfer.   
 
Table 11  
 
Frequency Distribution of Mock Pass/Fail Retest Scores  
 
 Time 1 Time 2  Fail Pass 
Fail 164 68 96 
Pass 176 6 170 
Note. N = 340 participants.  
 
For illustrative purposes, the distribution of mock pass/fail scores was computed 
using the standardized, unit-weighted composite of initial knowledge and ability test 
scores (see Table 11).  Participants who performed above the mean on the composite test 
score percentage (M = 54.15%) on the initial tests “passed” and those who performed 
below the mean “failed”.  These initial test score means were then used to compute the 
retest score passes and fails; participants who performed above the mean initial test score 
on the retest “passed” and those who performed below the mean initial test score on the 
retest “failed”.  Negative transfer occurs when those who initially passed subsequently 
fail upon retest.  This appears relatively rare: only 6 participants who initially passed 
failed upon retest (1.76% of the total sample of 340 test-takers, 3.41% of the initially 
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passing test-takers).  In contrast, 96 participants who initially failed passed upon retest 
(28.24% of the total sample of 340 test-takers, 58.54% of the initially failing test-takers).   
Policies allowing retesting often assume that retest scores are given more weight 
as the final operational test score, otherwise retesting would not be considered at all.  
Considering the present study’s results supporting the effects of memory, rather than 
learning, and the uneven distribution between test-takers who initially passed then failed 
compared to the distribution of test-takers who initially failed then passed, it appears 
quite likely that allowing retesting risks a greater ratio of false positives at the cost of 
relatively few false negatives.  It is also interesting to note that these pass/fail rates do 
not appear substantially different between same versus alternate retest forms (see Table 
12).  Implementing alternate retest forms may eliminate the potential for memory effects 
and serve the purposes of the present study’s research questions, yet be of a relatively 
small magnitude to exert an effect on operational decision-making.   
 
Table 12  
 






 Fail Pass 







Fail 164 33 35 51 45 
Pass 176 2 4 83 87 




Negative transfer occurs at both the test- and item-level.  Systematic retest 
increases (or even decreases) necessitate systematic response-changing between test 
administrations.  Previous research shows that test scores increase when applicants 
change both incorrect and correct responses between administrations (Bors & Vigneau, 
2003).  Test-takers who respond or even guess incorrectly do not necessarily commit to 
the same wrong response on retest (Kang et al., 2011).  For example, Bors and Vigneau 
(2002) found that although an overall test may exhibit acceptable reliability between 
administrations, it may nevertheless show low intra-item reliability.  Relatedly, te 
Nijenhuis et al. (2007) found that items with greater g-saturation exhibited lower 
endorsement rates upon retest, whereas items with lower g-saturation show greater 
endorsement rates.  This pattern of results implies that item-level response-changing 
may offer an additional avenue for competitively examining memory versus learning 
explanations at the item-level. 
Consistently responding to the same item across initial test and retest 
administrations reflects a degree of confidence in that response, potentially indicating 
confidence in one’s memory of the previous response or confidence in one’s 
understanding of the item (i.e., learning).  A test-taker may change responses from 
wrong to right (indicating learning) or right to wrong (indicating negative transfer).  
Thus, a taxonomy of response-changing may be constructed, whereby a pattern of results 
may best illustrate whether the retesting effect best reflects learning or memory at the 
item-level.  Examining only total test scores blurs this distinction, assuming that test-
takers merely repeat previous responses exactly and answer additional items correctly.  
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Response-changing offers another metric for investigating whether retest increases are 
more reflective of either learning or memory effects, the boundary conditions of 
retesting that may instead lead to negative transfer, and the particular behaviors 
underlying retest increases.  As noted previously, memory effects may simply be 
stronger or more prevalent than learning, rather than mutually exclusive.  It appears 
plausible that item-level response-changing offers a more finely-tuned method for 
examining that retesting acts as a learning intervention.  Although the present study 
inevitably collected item-level response data, the purpose of the design was to 
investigate whether memory versus learning better explained the retesting effect overall, 
not compare the magnitude of memory and learning simultaneously.  Thus, speaking to 
item-level issues and response-changing is beyond the scope of this study.    
8.3.2 Meta-Cognition.  Although substantial prior research has investigated 
meta-cognition through test-takers’ self-reported confidence in responses over time, 
examining item-level response-changing offers a viable behavioral measure for assessing 
the underlying cognitive processes of the retesting effect.  Testing reduces the otherwise 
ubiquitous tendency for test-takers to experience overconfidence in their own learning 
(e.g., Carpenter & Olson, 2012), leading some researchers to hypothesize that testing 
might improve meta-cognitive awareness or encourage the adoption of more effective 
encoding strategies (Carpenter, 2012; Pyc & Rawson, 2010).   
The present study investigated two individual differences, GMA and working 
memory capacity, as potential explanatory variables for learning versus memory effects, 
respectively.  Although these individual differences covary with meta-cognition, it 
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appears plausible that meta-cognitive behaviors and strategies are more directly related 
to retest increases than individual differences, and worth investigating further.  Research 
shows that corrective feedback facilitates the retesting effect (Butler et al., 2007; Kang et 
al., 2007) and that participants are aware of the potentially beneficial effects of testing 
(Jacoby et al., 2010).  Furthermore, particular meta-cognitive behaviors are likely to be 
more or less relevant to either the memory or learning explanation.  For example, a 
behavioral goal of remembering previous responses is more likely to result in memory 
effects, whereas a behavioral goal of self-diagnosing comprehension is more likely to 
result in learning effects.  Multiple methods with a wealth of prior research, such as 
meta-cognitive awareness inventories and think aloud protocols, do exist that would 
allow researchers to investigate test-taking behaviors, response changing, and response 
confidence.  Based on previous research and the present data, examining meta-cognitive 
behaviors may offer additional evidence as to whether retest increases reflect learning 
versus memory explanations, and if so, provide a more direct, behavioral mechanism for 
how these increases occur.  
8.3.3 Working Memory Training.  Some research posits that working memory 
training programs, fundamentally a retesting intervention, may be used to improve one’s 
standing on both ability and knowledge constructs.  A body of work by Jaeggi, 
Buschkuehl, and colleagues have examined the influence of working memory training 
on both ability (e.g., fluid intelligence, Jaeggi, Studer-Luethi, Buschkuehl, Su, Jonides, 
& Perrig, 2010) and knowledge constructs (e.g., reading performance, Loosli, 
Buschkuehl, Perrig, & Jaeggi, 2012).  Based on this work, it appears that working 
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memory capacity may be improved through retesting, which mediates the learning of 
ability and knowledge constructs. 
Previous meta-analytic evidence indicates that these programs can produce short-
term improvements in working memory skills, but these improvements are not 
consistent, appear test-specific, and do not transfer to improve the external criteria 
(Melby-Lervåg & Hulme, 2013).  Thus, working memory training may be yet another 
example of the retesting effect as best explained by memory, rather than learning.  
Perhaps relatedly, the present results indicated that working memory capacity exhibited 
small to moderate intercorrelations with the initial and retest scores for both knowledge 
and ability tests (see Table 9 for intercorrelations), but were poor predictors of the 
magnitude of actual retest increases (see Figure 6).   
8.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The retesting effect influences fundamental issues of measurement across the 
psychological, educational, and management literatures, and therefore, concerns the 
operational use of tests as well.  Greater insight into the retesting effect directly affects 
research questions that are foundational to psychology, including learning, retrieval 
processes, and the valid interpretation of psychological measurements over time.  The 
present study’s results are more in alignment with the memory than a learning 
explanation for the retesting effect.  Retest increases were attenuated by alternate retest 
forms (when memory effects were not possible), participants responded to retest items 
faster but this was attenuated by alternate test forms, and there were no differences 
between the magnitude of these retest increases regardless of the construct domain 
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(ability versus knowledge).  Researchers have proposed that retesting offers a viable, 
even underused technique for facilitating learning, yet the present study demonstrated 
that the benefits of retesting do not appear to meaningfully reflect learning.  Although no 
study is perfect, the limitations presented for the current study (e.g., choice of setting, 
item format) appear more likely to influence the magnitude of retest increases, rather 
than the pattern of results as reflecting either memory or learning.  Future research 
investigating the learning versus memory explanations for the retesting effect could lend 
additional insights by examining factors affecting negative retesting transfer (at both the 
test- and item-levels), additional explanatory variables for memory versus learning 
explanations for the retesting effect (e.g., meta-cognitive skills), and retesting in the 
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Sample items from General Introductory Psychology Exam 2.0 
 
This exam is designed to assess your knowledge of fundamental introductory 
psychology issues, concepts, and principles. Although this exam is being 
administered for research purposes only, please answer each item to the best of 
your ability. 
 
There are 20 items on this exam. For each item, select the alternative that you think 
is the BEST answer. There is no penalty for getting an item wrong or guessing. 
Hence, it is in your best interest to guess if you do not know the answer to an item.  
 
 A person is asleep, but her electroencephalograph (EEG) shows activity 
resembling that of the waking state. Her heart rate, blood pressure, and breathing 
are also similar to the waking state.  Based on these physiological responses, this 
person is most likely in which stage of sleep? 
 
 A.  Stage 1 
 B. Microsleep 
 *C.  REM  
 
 In Pavlov’s experiments, meat powder was placed on a dog’s tongue to serve as 
the: 
 
A. conditioned stimulus. 
*B. unconditioned stimulus. 
C. conditioned response. 
 




C. decoded.  
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Test Attitudes and Perceptions Survey 
DIRECTIONS 
The following questions ask you to rate your general attitudes and perceptions about the 
test you are about to take.  Your attitudes should be based on the information in the 
instruction set read aloud to you and the sample items you just completed.  Read each of 
the questions below and check or bubble the circle on the accompanying scale that 





























1. Doing well on this test is important to me.          
2. I want to do well on this test.          
3. I will try my best on this test.          
4. I will try to do the very best I can do on this test.          
5. While taking this test, I will concentrate and try to do 
well.          
6. I want to be among the top scorers on this test.          
7. I will push myself to work hard on this test.          
8. I am extremely motivated to do well on this test.          
9. I just don't care how I do on this test.          
10. I won't put much effort into this test.          
 
Anxiety 
11. I probably won't do as well as most of the other people 
who take this test.          
12. I am not good at taking tests.          
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13. During a test, I often think about how poorly I am doing.          
14. I usually get very anxious about taking tests.          
15. I usually do pretty well on tests.          
16. I expect to be among the people who score really well 
on this test.          
17. My test scores don't usually reflect my true abilities.          
18. I very much dislike taking tests of this type.          
19. For this test, I find myself thinking of the consequences 
of failing.          
20. During a test, I get so nervous I can't do as well as I 








Retest Interval Behavioral Inventory 
DIRECTIONS: For the following items, think about the time between the initial 
protocol session that you attended (i.e., the last time you participated in the study) and 
now.  Respond to each of these questions to the best of your recollection with as much 
information as you can provide.  
 
1. After you completed the tests from your last session, was any similar psychology 
content covered by a course instructor in class?  
 
 Yes                                   No 
 
2. After you completed the tests from the last session, did you seek the answers of the 
tests’ items in any way? 
 
 Yes                                   No 
 
3. If so, provide an estimate of how long you spent seeking answers to the tests’ 
items: __________ hours.  
 
4. Since the last time you were here, did you complete any psychology coursework 
(e.g., reading, studying) that was relevant to the previous tests’ material? 
 
 Yes                                   No 
 
5. If so, provide an estimate of how long you spent on psychology coursework (e.g., 
reading, studying) that was relevant to the previous tests’ material: __________ 
hours. 
 
6. Since the last time you were here, did you complete any GRE Psychology Test 
preparation? 
 
 Yes                                   No 
 
7. If so, provide an estimate of how many hours you spent preparing for the GRE 








GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY COMPETENCY EXAM MEASURE REVISION, 
UPDATE, AND REVALIDATION (CONTENT-RELATED) 
To revise and update the General Psychology Competency Exam (GPCE), a 
content-related validation approach was undertaken.  The goals of the GPCE’s content-
related revalidation were threefold: (1) to reassess whether the distribution of GPCE 
items adequately represented the introductory psychology content domain, (2) to ensure 
the GPCE reflected current knowledge within psychology as taught in an introductory 
psychology course, and (3) to expand the GPCE from 35 items to a total of 40 items 
which could be split into two alternate test forms of 20 items each, resulting in the GPCE 
2.0.  Due to marginal retest increases and concerns over a ceiling effect after pilot testing 
the measure (i.e., the GPCE 2.0), this test was subsequently further expanded to 
comprise 80 items which were split into two alternate test forms of 40 items each to 
create the GPCE 2.1.  These two 40 item alternate test forms were the final measure used 
for the present study.  
In updating the GPCE 2.0 with additional items, the first step consisted of 
determining core introductory psychology content and identifying subject matter experts 
(SMEs) to assess the extent to which the distribution of GPCE items adequately covered 
the introductory psychology content domain.  First, the population of SMEs was 
identified as Texas A&M University Psychology Department instructors and faculty 
who had previously taught at least one introductory psychology course in the past five 
years.  A sample of SMEs (n = 10) were recruited and used throughout the content-
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related validation procedures.  That is, the same 10 SMEs participated in establishing the 
GPCE 2.0’s content distribution and determining that the individual items of the GPCE 
2.0 were adequate (which will be described in detail below).  Next, copies of all 
available introductory psychology syllabi from the psychology department of Texas 
A&M University were obtained.  Based on these syllabi, the most commonly used 
introductory psychology textbooks were identified.  Using these introductory 
psychology textbooks’ chapter headings, common groupings of introductory psychology 
content were identified.  A proposed distribution of GPCE items reflecting core 
introductory psychology content domains was proposed based on the introductory 
psychology textbook content and the original GPCE’s content distribution (Arthur et al., 
2003). 
To establish the content-related validity of the measure, a three-step process was 
undertaken.  First, to establish that the GPCE 2.0’s content distribution adequately 
reflected the content distribution of core introductory psychology knowledge, the 10 
SMEs were individually interviewed to determine if the proposed GPCE test content 
distribution was representative of the breadth of introductory psychology content and, if 
not, what revisions they would recommend.  Second, based on the SMEs’ assessment, 
additional items were written as needed to meet the SMEs’ proposed content 
distribution.  Third, to establish that the individual items of the GPCE 2.0 were adequate, 
the SMEs completed ratings to assess the representativeness, correct labeling of content 
domain, and the correctness of the keyed responses of the GPCE’s individual items.  
Steps two and three were repeated as necessary if there were not enough items 
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considered to be satisfactory, and therefore, an inadequate number of items to meet the 
proposed content distribution.  Details of this process were as follows. 
First, the proposed GPCE introductory psychology content distribution and a 
rating form was provided to the SMEs to report their recommended distributions (see 
Appendix B.1 below, GPCE SME Content Distribution Rating Form, for this proposed 
distribution).  SMEs were informed that the purpose of these procedures was to update 
the GPCE to permit the creation of two alternate forms of a knowledge test assessing 
upper-level undergraduate psychology students’ mastery of basic core psychology 
principles, concepts, and facts.  Specifically, SMEs were asked whether they agreed with 
the proposed distribution, and if not, how they would change the distribution to better 
reflect the distribution of psychology content as they would teach the course.  These 
content distribution ratings were collected with the author and SME individually. 
After the SMEs’ distributions of introductory psychology content were 
completed, the mean of SMEs’ proposed content distributions was computed.  The 
SMEs’ distribution of core introductory psychology content was the same as that 
initially proposed on the GPCE SME Content Distribution Rating Form.  However, 




Item 1. Research has shown that in situations where several potential helpers fail to help or provide 
assistance to someone in need, it is typically because they: 
 
*A. fail to take personal responsibility for helping. 
B. fail to notice the event. 
C. experience or have difficulty thinking of how to help. 
 
Introductory Psychology Content Domain: Social Psychology 
1. Does this item correspond to the 
content domain as labeled? 
If no, then select a more 
representative content 
domain from the drop down 
menu below: 
2. Is this content covered 
in Introductory 
Psychology? 
                          
No                        Yes Content domain 
                          
No                        Yes 
3. Does this item reflect “walking 
knowledge” following completion 
of Introductory Psychology? 
4. Is the keyed response 
clearly the best one? 
5. What is your estimate 
of the probability (0 to 
100) that a minimally 
competent (i.e., C) 
student will answer 
the item correctly. 
                          
No                        Yes 
                          
No                        Yes     
 
Figure B.1. Sample item from GPCE Measure Review Booklet for Subject Matter 
Experts. 
 
Beginning with the initial pool of 35 items from the original GPCE, an additional 
15 items were written based on standard item writing practices to generate an item pool 
that comprised 50 items.  Next, these items were provided to the same 10 SMEs who 
were initially contacted, who were then asked to review the items and provide feedback 
pertaining to the quality of the items.  Specifically, the SMEs were asked to review the 
items and provide information as to whether the items were representative and within the 
scope of the curriculum they taught, adequately represented the content domain as 
labeled (e.g., methods, social psychology, neuroscience), reflected “walking knowledge” 
following the completion of an introductory psychology course, and were keyed 
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correctly.  SMEs also provided an Angoff-type rating estimating the probability that a 
minimally competent (i.e., C) student could answer the item correctly.  (See Appendix 
B.2 for the GPCE Measure Review Booklet for Subject Matter Experts and a sample 





































1 100%  100% 90% 80% 70.00 
2 90% Consciousness 100% 80% 70% 71.50 
3 100%  100% 100% 100% 80.40 
4 100%  100% a 90% 70% 72.00 
5 100%  100% a 90% 100% 64.00 
       
6 100%  100% 90% 88.89% a 67.00 
7 100%  90% 80% 100% 71.00 
8 100%  100% 100% 100% 75.50 
9 100%  100% 80% 100% 68.50 
10 100%  100% 66.67% a 88.89% a 62.00 a 
       
11 90% Learning 90% 70% 80% 57.50 
12 100%  70% 60% 100% 61.50 
13 100%  90% 66.67% a 50% 49.30 
14 100%  100% 100% 100% 74.20 
15 100% a  100% a 88.89% a 100% a 81.11 a 
       
16 100%  90% 80% 66.67% a 55.50 
17 100%  100% 100% 100% 79.30 
18 100%  60% 50% 70% 52.30 
19 100%  100% 100% 100% 74.00 
20 90% Emotion and Motivation 80% 70% 80% 63.80 
       
21 70% Personality 100% 100% 100% 75.00 
22 90% Emotion & Motivation 50% 50% 88.89% 
a 56.30 
23 100%  80% 70% 90% 67.90 
24 100%  100% 90% 90% 62.30 
25 100%  90% 100% 100% 74.00 
Note. N = 10 SME Raters.  a N =  9 raters. If alternate item content was proposed for the item by multiple 




Next, based on the SMEs’ feedback, items were either eliminated or modified as 
necessary as described below.  Table B.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the SMEs’ 
Table B.1 (Continued) 
 





























26 100%  90% 90% 100% 65.00 
27 100%  100% 90% 100% 67.50 
28 100%  100% 90% 100% 83.50 
29 100% a  88.89% a 66.67% a 100% a 60.00 a 
30 100% a  66.67% a 66.67% a 100% a 58.67 a 
       
31 100% a  88.89% a 66.67% a 100% a 61.67 a 
32 100% a  88.89% a 88.89% a 100% a 78.67 a 
33 90% Human Development 100% 100% 100% 79.50 
34 100%  100% 100% 100% 79.00 
35 100%  90% 90% 100% 66.50 
       
36 100%  100% 90% 100% 64.00 
37 100%  100% 100% 100% 77.50 
38 100%  90% 80% 100% 66.50 
39 100%  40% 30% 80% 50.00 
40 90% Missing 80% 50% 70% 58.50 
       
41 100%  100% 100% 90% 68.00 
42 70% Social Psychology 90% 90% 100% 71.50 
43 100%  100% 100% 100% 79.50 
44 100%  90% 80% 100% 69.30 
45 100%  66.67% a 80% 100% 73.50 
       
46 100%  100% 100% 100% 67.00 
47 100%  60% 50% 80% 50.50 
48 100%  100% 100% 100% 78.00 
49 90% Psychological Disorders 80% 70% 80% 65.50 
50 90% Neuroscience 80% 60% 80% 59.50 
Note. N = 10 SME Raters.  a N =  9 raters. If alternate item content was proposed for the item by multiple 
raters, all raters proposed the same alternate item content category. 
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ratings for the initial item pool.  Items with 70% or less SME agreement (i.e., 7 out of 
the 10) that item’s content was representative or within the scope of the curriculum they 
taught or reflected “walking knowledge” following completion of an introductory 
psychology course were eliminated.  Seven items were eliminated on the basis of this 
decision rule.  After these items were dropped, only 35 items remained.  However, there 
was some disagreement among the SMEs as to whether some of these remaining items 
were correctly keyed.  Specifically, eight of these 35 items were considered adequate, 
but 80% or less of the SMEs agreed that the item’s keyed response was clearly the best.  
Dropping these eight items would substantially reduce the items available for the two 
test forms and drastically alter the content distribution of the measure (see Figure B.2).  
Thus, these items were provisionally retained pending additional review and editing by 




Figure B.2. Initial GPCE (2.0) content distribution goal (black) versus the current distribution of items 
rated as acceptable from SMEs (gray). 
To meet the necessary number of items for the construction of two alternate test 
forms of 20 items each and the proposed GPCE content distribution, 12 additional items 
were written to ensure adequate content representation across the two test forms.  The 8 
discrepantly keyed items were also retained as potential items.  Next, an additional SME 
meeting was conducted with a panel of four SMEs from the original sample of SMEs to 
review (1) previous items with adequate item ratings but discrepancies on the keyed 
response, and (2) the 12 new items.  Specifically, the SMEs were instructed to identify, 
clarify, or modify the discrepantly keyed items by determining whether the keyed 
responses were in fact the best response, whether another alternative was the best 

























whether the item was inadequate and an entirely new item was needed.  This process 
was repeated with the 12 new items.  Items were not retained unless all SMEs 
unanimously agreed that the item was adequate (through rewriting the stem, response 
options, or both).  Items were dropped if the SMEs could not reach consensus or 
believed that the item could not be rewritten to be adequate.  
Upon completion of this process, 49 items remained.  Because only 40 items 
were needed for the final version, items were retained for the final version by selecting 
the best 40 (in terms of covering introductory psychology content that was considered 
suitably broad, walking knowledge by the SME consensus panel) of the 49 items, 
coupled with selecting pairs of items with matching content for the alternate forms.  (For 
clarity, only items that all SMEs unanimously approved were retained.)  Finally, these 
items were split into two alternate test forms (Test Forms A and B) to match the 
distribution of introductory psychology content as developed by SMEs (see Figure B.3).  
Items were arranged in the same order of introductory psychology content across test 




Figure B.3. Final GPCE (2.1) content distribution goal (black) versus the current 
distribution of items rated as acceptable from SMEs (gray). 
 
After pilot testing this version of the GPCE, no retest increases were observed 
across test forms, causing concern that the short test (20 items per form) exhibited a 
ceiling effect.  Thus, the GPCE 2.0 was expanded further to comprise 80 items total, 
which were split into two alternate test forms of 40 items to create the GPCE 2.1.  The 
goal was to double the number of test items while maintaining the same distribution of 
psychology content across both test forms.  Test administration time was kept constant 
(15 minutes).   
Rather than replicating the previous process, additional items were obtained from 





















item parameters from a normative sample.  These additional items were not assessed by 
SMEs using same process as the GPCE’s previous items; instead, their inclusion relied 
exclusively on psychometric item statistics reported by Spurlock et al. (2000).   
Only items for which item statistics were reported were considered for inclusion.  
To be retained, items had to meet three criteria.  First, items were selected if they were 
labeled as “conceptual/applied” rather than “factual”.  Second, items were retained if the 
difficulty was less than or equal to .70 (i.e., 30% or less of the test-takers responded to 
the item correctly).  Third, items were retained if the item discriminability was greater 
than or equal to .30.  Items exhibiting these desired parameters were identified from each 
of the test bank’s content domains that matched the pre-established distribution of 
introductory psychology content.     
Once this initial pool of items within each content domain was identified, items 
were retained as follows.  First, items assessing overlapping content to the current GPCE 
alternate test forms’ items were excluded.  Next, items reflecting similar topics within a 
particular content domain that could be easily separated to create the two alternate test 
forms were retained.  Finally, the test bank items were modified from their initial 4–
option multiple choice response format to match the GPCE’s 3–option multiple choice 
response format.  To generate 3–option versions of the test bank items, the 
unkeyed alternative response with the lowest endorsement percentage was eliminated 
(Edwards, Arthur, & Bruce, 2012).  The additional items were arranged were placed 
immediately after the original items, in the same order of content domain from the 
original test.  
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Appendix B.1 
GPCE SME Content Distribution Rating Form   
Name: _____________________________   Date: _________________________  
Area: ______________________________  
Instructions:  
Do you consider the current GPCE Content Domain Breakdown to be 
representative?  
 Yes    or     No? 
If no, then how would you redistribute these items? 
Psychology 107 Topic Proposed GPCE Content Domain Item Breakdown 









Emotion and Motivation 1 
Language, Thinking, and 
Intelligence 1 
Human Development 1 
Personality 1 
Stress, Coping, Health, and 
Well-Being 1 
Psychological Disorders 1 
Treatment of Psychological 
Disorders 1 







GPCE Measure Review Booklet for Subject Matter Experts 
Name:       
Area: Choose your program area: 
As part of my dissertation, I am in the process of updating and revising a knowledge 
exam (i.e., the General Psychology Competency Exam [GPCE]) that assesses upper-
level undergraduate psychology students’ mastery of some basic, core psychology 
principles, concepts, and facts.  Consequently, because of your background as an 
introductory psychology instructor, I am soliciting your input in reviewing and rating the 
items for this exam.  Your judgments as a subject matter expert are valuable to this item 
review process as the results will help us determine which items should be retained, 
revised, or dropped, and subsequently, allow us to develop an exam that can be used to 
investigate the specified issues in my dissertation.   
ITEM RATING INSTRUCTIONS 
Please carefully read and follow all the instructions contained in this electronic form. If 
you do not understand an item or the instructions as written, feel free to email me at 
AndrewMNaber@gmail.com or call me at 410-279-7125.  
When you have finished your subject matter expert (SME) ratings of all 40 items, save 
the document as a word .docx file with your initials at the end of the file name. For 
example, I would save the document as GPCE SME Item Rating Form AMN.docx.  
Then, please email the document back to me at AndrewMNaber@gmail.com 
This electronic rating form contains five ratings for each test item. Please read each item 
carefully and answer each question according to the instructions below:    
1. Does this item correspond to the content domain as labeled?
 Click Yes, if this item represents the underlying content domain as it is
labeled.
 Click No, if this item does not represent the underlying content domain as it
is labeled.
If the item does NOT correspond to the content domain as labeled, please select from 
the PSYC 107 content domains listed below that you would consider the item as 
assessing. You may select from these domains on the rating form by using the drop 
down menu for each item. 
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PSYC 107 Content Domains:  
Methods 
Neuroscience 




Emotion and Motivation 
Language, Thinking, and Intelligence 
Human Development 
Personality 
Stress, Coping, Health, and Well-Being 
Psychological Disorders 
Treatment of Psychological Disorders  
Social Psychology  
 
2. Is this content covered in Introductory Psychology as you teach or have taught 
it? 
 Click Yes, if this item was covered in your Introductory Psychology course. 
 
 Click No, if this item was not covered in your Introductory Psychology course. 
 
3. Does this item reflect “walking knowledge” following completion of 
Introductory Psychology? 
 Click Yes, if this item reflects knowledge that minimally competent students 
(i.e., C students) would maintain and understand after completing Introductory 
Psychology and without needing to review reference materials.  
 
 Click No, if this item does not reflect knowledge that minimally competent 
students (i.e., C students) would be expected to maintain and understand after 
completing Introductory Psychology without needing to review reference 
materials. 
 
4. Is the keyed response clearly the best one? Note that keyed responses are 
marked with an *.  
 Click Yes, if this item’s keyed response is clearly the best option. 
 
 Click No, if this item’s keyed response is not clearly the best option. 
 
5. What is the likelihood or probability that a minimally competent student would 
correctly answer the item?  
A minimally competent student means that the student possesses enough 
knowledge to obtain a “C” in an introductory psychology course. If the student 
were any less knowledgeable, he or she could not obtain a “C” average upon 
completion of the course.   
 





HYPOTHESIZED PATTERN OF RESULTS FOR MEMORY VERSUS 





Figure C.1. Hypotheses 1a and 3a versus 1b and 3b: Total test score (percentage) 

































































Figure C.2. Hypothesis 2a versus 2b: Mean item response time by same versus 
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Figure C.3. Hypothesis 4a versus 4b: The relationship between working memory and 
retest score increases and the relationship between GMA and retest scores increases for 






















































































































Figure C.4. Hypothesis 5a versus 5b: Total test score (percentage) by same versus 









































































Figure C.5. Hypothesis 6a versus 6b: Mean item response time by same versus 
alternate form retest with corrective feedback or no corrective feedback over time 














































Figure C.5 (Continued). Hypothesis 6a versus 6b: Mean item response time by same 
versus alternate form retest with corrective feedback or no corrective feedback over 















































Figure C.6. Hypothesis 7a versus 7b: Total test score (percentage) by same versus 












































































Figure C.7. Hypothesis 8a versus 8b: The relationship between working memory and 
retest score increases and the relationship between GMA and retest scores increases for 
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RAW SCORE FIGURES 
 
Figure D.1. Hypotheses 1 and 3: Total test score by same form retest versus alternate 







Figure D.2. Hypothesis 2: Mean item response time by same form retest versus 











Initial Test Same Form Retest Alternate Form
Retest






































Same Form Retest Alternate Form
Retest


















Figure D.4. Hypothesis 6: Mean item response time by same versus alternate form retest 
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Figure D.5. Hypothesis 7: Total test score by same versus alternate form retest 






































RETEST INTERVALS BY CONDITIONS 
Table E.1 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Retest Intervals across Form 
Manipulations 
 





 Form A Form B 
Form A 
 
M = 7.52, SD = .88 
 
Same Forms 
(AA, N = 82) 
 
 
M = 7.44, SD = .93 
 
Alternate Forms 




M = 7.79, SD = 1.17 
 
Alternate Forms 
(AB, N = 89) 
 
 
M = 7.62, SD = 1.07 
 
Same Forms 
(BB, N = 87) 
 
Note. Total N = 340.  Retest interval minimum was 7 days and 




 Table E.2 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Retest Intervals across Feedback 
Manipulation 
 
 M SD N 
No Feedback 7.60 1.05 172 
Corrective Feedback 7.59 1.00 168 
Note. Total N = 340.  Retest interval minimum was 7 days and 
maximum was 10 days across both conditions. 
